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1. 
 OVERVIEW OF THE ASSESSMENT
 
This report, consisting of ten volumes, repre­
sents the results of the 
SEASAT Economic Assessment, as
 
completed through August 31, 
1975. The individual volumes
 
in this report are:
 
Volume I 
 Summary and Conclusions
 
Volume II 
 The SEASAT System Description and
 
Performance
 
Volume III Offshore Oil and Natural Gas 
Industry 
-

Case Study and Generalization 
Volume IV - Ocean Mining Case Study and Generali­
zation
 
Volume V - Coastal Zones 

- Case Study and Generali­
zation 
Volufie VI - Arctic Operations 
- Case Study and 
Generalization 
Volume VII - Marine Transportation 
- Case Study and 
Generalization 
Volume VIII 
- Ocean Fishing - Case Study and Generali­
zation 
Volume IX - Ports and Harbors 
- Case Study and Gen­
eralization 
Volume X - A Program for the Evaluation of Opera­
tional SEASAT System Costs.
 
Each volume is self-contained and fully documents
 
the results in the study area corresponding to the title.
 
Table 1.1 describes the content of 
each volume to aid readers
 
in the selection of material that is 
of specific interest.
 
The SEASAT Economic Assessment began during Fis­
cal Year 1975. The objectives of the preliminary economic
 
assessment, conducted during Fiscal Year 1975, 
were to identi­
fy the uses and users of the data that could be produced by
 
an operational SEASAT system and 
to provide preliminary esti­
mates of 
the benefits produced by the applications of this
 
la~I . : CoInLent ind OtganzaLiOll of Lhe Final Report 
Volume No. -I tie ContLcl
" 
L Summary and Conclusion. A summary of benefits 
major findcngs of tile 
and COSL, 
assessment. 
and a statement of the 
IT The SEASAP System 
Description and Per-
fornance 
A discussion of user requirements, and the system concepts 
to satiLsfy these roquirements are presented along with a 
preliminary analysis of tle costs of those systems. A 
description of the plan for the SEASAT data utility studies 
and a discussion of the preliminary results of the simula­
tion experilments conducted with the ob3ective of quantifying 
the effects of SEASAr data on numerical forecasting. 
ITT Offshore Oil and 
Natural Gas Industry-
Case Study and Gener-
a150 Lion 
The results of case studies which investigate tile effects of 
forecasL accuracy Oh offfshoLe operations in the North Sea, 
tile Celtic Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico are reported. A 
methodology for generalizing the results to other geographic 
regions of offshore oil and natural gas exploration and de­
velopment is described along wilh an estimate of the world­
wide benefits. 
TV Ocean Mining - Case 
Study and Genera t-
tratIato 
phe results of a study of the weather sensitLive features of 
the near shore and deep water ocean mining industries are 
described. Problems with the evaluation of economic benefits 
for the deep water ocean mining industry are attributed to 
tile relative IlmatUrILy and highly proprietary nature of tle 
industry. 
'Tmhtc .!, Cont.nt. and Orcjainiz ntio of t e rind, Report 
Volume No. Title Content 
V Coastal Zones - Case 
Study and General-
iQatL.n 
The tundy and generaIizaton deal with ihe economic losses 
rnsLoinned in the U.S. coastal zones for the purpose of 
quantitatJvoly establishing economic benefits as a conse­
quence of improving the predictive quality of destructive 
phenomena in U.S coastal Yones. Improved prediction of 
hurricane )andfall and iunproved experimental knoledge of 
iurricane seeding are discu; 'ed. 
VI Arctic OperaiLons - Case 
Study and Generalization 
The hynothotlica] development and transporLatLion or Artic 
oil and ether rseoes by ,n breaking super tanker to 
the continental :ast Coast are discussed. SBASAT data will 
contribute to n more effeetive transportation operatlon 
through the ArLit ice by reducing transportation costs as 
a consequence of Leduced transit tLime per voyage. 
VII Narine Transportation-
Case S.idy anti General-
izatIon 
A discussion of the case studies of the potential use of 
SCASAT ocean condi tioen data in the improved routing of dry 
cargo ships and tankers. Resulting forecasts could be 
useful in roui.ing ships around storms, thereby reducing 
adverse weather damage, time loss, relnted operaLions costs, 
and occasional catastrophic losses. 
VIII Ocean 
SLdy 
ation 
Ptshing - Case 
and Generaliz-
The potentaal application ot SEASAT data with regard to 
ocean fisherie, is discussed in this case study. Tracking 
fish populations, indirect assistance in forecasting expected
populations and assistance to fishing fleets in avoiding 
costs incurred due to adverse Weather throuigh improved ocean 
conditions forecast, were investigated. 
TX Ports 
SLudy 
and 
and 
iarbors - Case 
Generalizatlion 
The case stuidy and goneralizaLon quantify beneffits ntade 
possible through improved wcathor forecasting resulting 
from the integrat ion of SCASAT data InL local weather 
forecasts . The major source of avoidable economic losses 
from inadequate weaLther forocastinq daL was shown to be 
dependent en local procnpitaLion forecasting. 
X A Progrant for tie tvall-
aLien of Operational 
S[PASA' System CosLs 
A diSLUSgiion or tLe SATILI 2 
ad;sgt tu tINe evaluatloit of 
yS.tit aLeten.Ltves. SArIi. 
effects of operatioltal requ 
phabod eosl of altornatLve 
Prograin wiich wag developed to 
the conts of operational SrASAI ' 
2 onale L te .se nsrvnietnt of the 
remnents, relablity 
, 
and Lime-. 
approaches. 
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data.* The preliminary economic assessment identified large
 
potential benefits from the use of SEASAT-produced data in the
 
areas of Arctic operations, marine transportation, and offshore
 
oil and natural gas exploration and development.
 
During Fiscal Year 1976, the effort was directed to­
ward the confirmation of the benefit estimates in 
the three
 
previously identified major areas of use of SEASAT data, as
 
well as the estimation of benefits in additional application
 
areas. The confirmation of the benefit estimates in 
the three
 
major areas of application was accomplished by increasing both
 
the extent of user involvement and the depth of each of the
 
studies. Upon completion of this process of estimation, we have
 
concluded that substantial, firm benefits from the use of oper­
ational SEASAT data can be obtained in areas that are extensions
 
of current operations such as marine transportation and offshore
 
oil and natural gas exploration and development. Very large
 
potential benefits from the use of SEASAT data 
are possible in
 
an area of operations that is now in the planning or conceptual
 
stage, namely the transportation of oil, natural gas, and other
 
resources by surface ship in the Arctic regions. in this case,
 
the benefits are dependent upon the rate of development of the
 
resources that are believed 
to be in the Arctic regions, and
 
also dependent upon the choice of surface transportation over
 
pipelines as the means of moving these resources 
to the lower
 
SEASAT Economic Assessment, ECON, inc., October 1974.
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latitudes. Our studies have also identified that large
 
potential benefits may be possible from the use of SEASAT
 
data in support of ocean fishing operations. However, in
 
this case, the size of the sustainable yield of the ocean
 
remains an unanswered question; thus, a conservative view­
point concerning the size of the benefit should be adopted
 
until the process of biological replenishment is more
 
completely understood.
 
With the completion of this second year of the
 
SEASAT Economic Assessment, we conclude that the cumulative
 
gross benefits that may be obtained through the use of data
 
from an operational SEASAT system, to provide improved ocean
 
condition and weather forecasts is in the range of $859
 
million to $2,709 million ($1975 at a 10 percent discount
 
rate) from civilian activities. These are gross benefits
 
that are attributable ex-clusively to the use of SEASAT data
 
products and do not include potential benefits from other
 
possible sources of weather and ocean forecasting that may
 
occur in the same period of time. The economic benefits
 
to U.S. military activities from an operational SEASAT sys­
tem are not included in these estimates. A separate study
 
of U.S. Navy applications has been conducted under the
 
sponsorship of the Navy Environmental Remote Sensing Coor­
dinating and Advisory Committee. The purpose of this Navy
 
study was to determine the stringency of satellite oceano­
graphic measurements necessary to achieve improvements in
 
6 
military mission effectiveness in areas where benefits are
 
known to exist.* It is currently planned that the Navy
 
will use SEASAT-A data to quantify benefits in military
 
applications areas. A one-time military benefit of approx­
imately $30 million will be obtained by SEASAT-A, by pro­
viding a measurement capability in support of the Depart­
ment of Defense Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Program.
 
Preliminary estimates have been made of the costs
 
of an operational SEASAT program that would be capable of
 
producing the data needed to obtain these benefits. The
 
hypothetical operational program used to model the costs of
 
an operational SEASAT system includes SEASAT-A, followed by
 
a number of developmental and operational demonstration
 
flights, with full operational capability commencing in
 
1985. The cost of the operational SEASAT system through
 
2000 is estimated to be about $753 million ($1975, 0 per­
cent discount rate) which is the equivalent of $272 million
 
($1975) at a 10 percent discount rate. It should be noted
 
that this cost does not include the costs of the program's
 
unique ground data handling equipment needed to process,
 
disseminate or utilize the information produced from SEASAT
 
data. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the net cumulative
 
SEASAT exclusive benefit stream (benefits less costs) as a
 
"Specifications of Stringency of Satellite Oceano­
graphic Measurements for Improvement of Navy Mission
 
Effectiveness." (Draft Report.) Navy Remote Sensing
 
Coordinating and Advisory Committee, May 1975.
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9 
function of the discount rate.
 
This volume describes the results of the case
 
studies and generalization of the economic benefits of
 
improved forecasts of weather and ocean conditions to
 
coastal zone regions.
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2.1 
2. 	 CASE STUDY AND GENERALIZATION OF
 
COASTAL ZONE ECONOMIC BENEFITS
 
Introduction
 
The coastal region of the United States, its coastal
 
waters, beaches and some distance inland, is frequently
 
subjected to destructive forces as a result of the natural
 
interactive influences of sea conditions and weather.
 
This coastal region is the site of many national
 
industrial and commercial activities as well as the loca­
tion of residential population, both permanent and transient,
 
together with substantial recreational facilities. The
 
destructive forces generated can produce quite extensive
 
amounts of property damage and losses of life and livelihood.
 
The historical occurrence of these destructive coastal
 
zone phenomena is reasonably well documented and has-led to
 
the introduction of construction practices which attempt to
 
minimize the economic and human losses that can be produced.
 
Concurrently, national emergency programs have been organized
 
which attempt to convince the population that evacuation would
 
be prudent and which also provide relief to those that suffer
 
the consequences of the destructive phenomena.
 
It is generally clear that today nothing can be done
 
to diminish either the power of the destructive forces
 
generated or to divert the destructive process away from
 
the coastal zone, although hurricane seeding is being ex­
perimentally explored for both these purposes.
 
However, it is -reasonably contended that if reliable,
 
accurate and timely prediction of the time, location and
 
duration of occurrence of these destructive coastal zone
 
phenomena could be made then the consequent economic losses
 
could be reduced. In theory, with perfect predictive ability
 
and the means to adequately disseminate the prediction
 
conditions, that is within a totally credible prediction
 
system, every conceivable action to protect life and property
 
could be introduced and all programs for relief following
 
the destructive occurrence could be mobilized with maximum
 
effectiveness. Thus would perfect prediction provide a
 
systematic means of reducing economic losses as a consequence
 
of coastal zone destructive phenomena. These reduced economic
 
losses will be called avoidable losses. 'To the extent that
 
there is imperfection in the procedure of prediction, there
 
will be reluctance to initiate actions to contend with the
 
destructive force possibility and so will the effectiveness
 
of mobilization of relief be diminished. Imperfect predic­
tion then implies that certain avoidable losses will be sus­
tained and also that certain avoidable losses will actually
 
be avoided.
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SEASAT, as an operational entity, will provide sea
 
condition and weather phenomena data, not previously avail­
able in terms of scope, quality and frequency of observation.
 
This data, introduced as input into appropriate phenomeno­
logical and numerical computer models, will to some degree im­
prove the capability of prediction that is available. The
 
SEASAT data availability can then be visualized as being re­
sponsible for the actual avoidance of some apparent avoidable
 
economic losses to the United States coastal zone region.
 
These incremental avoidable economic losses, assumed actually
 
to be avoided, are the direct economic benefit 
 enerated by
 
SEASAT.
 
The procedure of prediction is of a complexity
 
which obscures the clarity of SEASAT's 
actual data contribu­
tion so that economic benefits to 
prediction improvement in
 
general are more simple to visualize.
 
This case study and its generalization seek to
 
quantitatively establish economic benefits and SEASAT economic
 
benefits as a consequence of improving the predictive quality
 
of occurrence of coastal zone destructive phenomena.
 
2.2 Summary
 
The coastal zones of the United States; Atlantic,
 
Gulf of Mexico, Pacific, Alaska and Hawaii, have been evaluated
 
for the economic losses they sustain from naturally occurring
 
phenomena which destroy both life and property.
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These phenomena are the result of oceanographic and
 
meteorological processes which give rise to unusual and
 
excessive winds, rainfall and sea conditions, which then in a
 
variety of ways produce the economic losses.
 
It is reasoned that through accurate modelling of the
 
phenomena in question, with appropriate and extensive
 
observational data as input to the models, such as 
SEASAT can
 
provide, prediction of the time, place and duration of the
 
occurrence 
of the phenomena and their associated destructive
 
characteristics could be improved. 
 This improved prediction
 
capability would then allow some economic losses to 
be
 
avoided, if appropriate precautions are implemented. Economic
 
losses that can be avoided are termed benefits. 
In addition, specifically for hurricanes , and therefore, 
for the Atlantic and Gulf coastal zones, error in prediction
 
of the landfall of a hurricane results in incremental
 
precautionary expenditures for prevention of damage and 
loss
 
of life. Improvement in landfall prediction through more
 
efficient modelling and 
input data will reduce the landfall
 
error and diminish the incremental precautionary expenditures.
 
This reduction is an additional benefit.
 
Finally, a possibility exists that the destructive
 
force of a hurricane can be diminished by appropriate seeding
 
during the hurricane process. It is assumed that the seeding
 
effect diminishes the peak winds associated with the hurricane.
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2.3 
Hurricane damage reduction is considered only as wind force
 
reduction, however, and not from hurricane 
induced storm surge
 
modification. 
 It should be noted that the potential effects of
 
seeding are inadequately understood at 
the present time. For
 
example, if the reduction of wind forces produced by seeding is
 
accompanied by changes in precipitation patterns, it is possible
 
that a disbenefit could also be incurred. 
 Effective seeding,
 
essentially an experimental technique, 
can only be developed
 
from improved hurricane dynamic modelling and an adequacy of
 
real data input.
 
The benefit ranges for each of the three cited 
sources
 
or origins for the year 1985 are 
shown in Table 2.1. The
 
1985 benefits are 
assumed to be representative of the annual
 
benefits for 
each year from 1985 to 2000. They depend on data
 
provided by a wide variety of 
sources. 
 It has been estimated
 
that SEASAT may be considered to be 
the source of 30 percent
 
of these benefits through the unique and extensive data it will
 
provide in its operational configuration. Benefits are inte­
grated and discounted for the time interval from 1985 
to the
 
time horizon of the study, 2000. 
 The integrated benefits 
are
 
shown in Table 2.2.
 
Conclusion's
 
As the historical data available attests, there 
are
 
substantial estimated annual economic 
losses in property and
 
in life 
from the natural phenomena producing destructive forces
 
in the nation's coastal zones. 
 Most of these phenomena develop
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Table 2.1 1985 Coastal Zone Benefits
 
Estimated Annual Benefit Range 
-
($ million)Benefit Origin 

Minimum -Maximum
 
Improved prediction of 
destructive phenomena * 
Improved prediction of 1.4 28
 
Hurricane landfall
 
Seeding of 	landfall
 
2.9 	 63
hurricanes 

Total benefit 4 91
 
*Benefits not included in totals because physical or opera­
tional prevention costs are not estimatable.
 
Table 2.2 	 Integrated Coastal Zone
 
Benefits 1985-2000
 
Discount rate % - 0 5 10 15 
Benefits from all data 64-1456 27-610 12-274 6-134
 
(5 millions)
sources 

Benefits exclusive to
SenSTta (xcmillios 16-432 7-181 
 3-81 1-40
SEASAT data ($ millions)
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under the influence of reasonably well understood meteoro­
logical and oceanographic conditions. The economic losses
 
that they produce, however, result from an inability to pre­
dict (or control) the magnitudes of the destructive char­
acteristics that will be produced in the coastal waters and
 
in the coastal zone land regions.
 
Computer models and simulations of these natural
 
phenomena, their processes of formation and their character­
istics of propagation are being developed but the accuracy of
 
their outputs is constrained largely by the absence of large­
scale and high quality data for pertinent parameters, by which
 
the models are initialized.
 
The large scale nature of the development of the de­
structive phenomena and their total process of formation and
 
disintegration makes remotely sensed satellite data of great
 
apparent significance to their understanding and modelling.
 
However in a strict sense, at this time, the precise
 
sensitivity of prediction to the improved data gathering cap­
abilities of a satellite is not known. Though there is an
 
apparent basis for improvement, it is not yet quantifiable.
 
Economic losses suffered can be regarded as a mixture of
 
avoidable and nonavoidable losses. Losses which are avoid­
able are those assumed to be excludable if appropriate fore­
cast knowledge is available. Forecast knowledge implies
 
correctly identifying the totality of interaction of natural
 
phenomena with the coastal zone region. Then it is assumed
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that preventative 
measures can be established by which the
 
losses 
are avoided. If the required preventative measures
 
are only procedural, then it is 
clear that the avoidable
 
losses can become benefits to the improved prediction re­
sulting from the data made available. That is, if only a
 
procedural change is 
required, expenditure for prevention
 
is minimal. 
 On the other hand if the'preventative measures
 
needed involve operations or physical structures to be con­
structed and maintained then the relationship between avoid­
able losses and benefits must be modified by the cost of pre­
vention.
 
In this case 
study, losses result in general from
 
abnormal localized occurrences of wind, rain, sea levels and
 
breakers. It is difficult to 
realistically determine the 
true
 
composition of avoidable losses without extensive statistical
 
knowledge of phenomena characteristics and 
cost of prevention
 
relative to benefits. The benefits developed in this case
 
study and generalization are therefore based largely on qual­
itative acceptance that the data will generate improvement in
 
prediction, and judgmental estimates of the 
expected mangitudes
 
of the improvement. This is apparent in the ranges of minimum
 
to maximum benefit.
 
2.4 The 
Case Study, Results and Generalizations
 
Coastal zone economic losses 
are the result of ob­
servable phenomena resulting from abnormal wind and 
sea
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conditions, generally in combination, and frequently accom­
panied by heavy rainfall.
 
The coastal zone waters are violently disturbed,
 
their disturbance penetrating into ports, harbors and marinas,
 
breakers and surf, through their pounding action damage or
 
destroy formations and structures installed to contain the
 
sea 
and the sea invades the coastal land surface. If a par­
ticular disturbance coincides with normal very high tides,
 
then the sea invasion of the land is very extensive.
 
For the case study, the general meteorological and
 
oceanographic observable phenomena are identified as well as
 
the ordered significance of these phenomena with respect 
to
 
the various United States coastal regions, and the production
 
of economic losses there. Data is assembled from which esti­
mates of coastal zone damages have been made.
 
Since avoidable economic loss reduction is the result
 
of prediction of the occurrence of abnormal phenomena, the
 
data for predictive modelling is discussed as is the signifi­
cance of SEASAT's input data.
 
Hurricanes as coastal zone economic loss producing
 
phenomena are discussed in depth to 
identify the significance
 
of hurricane landfall prediction. Both the minimization of
 
losses to property and life and the minimization of unneces­
sary expense for emergency procedures are discussed. In ad­
dition, hurricane seeding is discussed as a potential moderat­
ing mechanism of the hurricane's force.
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2.4.1 	 Coastal Zone Economic Loss Producing
 
Natural Phenomena
 
The principal oceanographic and meteorological
 
phenomena whose occurrence produces economic losses both
 
avoidable and unavoidable in the coastal zones are typically
 
as follows:
 
a Storm surges from tropical storms and
 
hurricanes
 
e Storm surges from extratropical storms
 
o 	 High winds and wind-driven waves associated
 
with tropical storms and hurricanes
 
o 	 High winds and wind-driven waves associated
 
with extratropical storms and severe frontal
 
systems
 
o 	 High surf resulting from long-period swells,
 
generated by distant storms
 
o 	 Violent local winds associated with isolated
 
squall lines or severe thunderstorms
 
( 	 Tsunamis (tidal waves) caused by earthquakes.
 
The storm surge raises the level of the sea above its
 
normal tidal rise perhaps as much as 30 feet and is associated
 
with wind and low pressure drop. The high surf results from
 
substantial sea swells which produce'very large breakers upon
 
bhoaling in shallow waters. Tsunamis are seismically produced
 
sea waves-.
 
Natural phenomena that cause economic loss vary in im­
portance with the United States coastal zone region. The pre­
dominant loss producing phenomena around the coast of the con­
tinental United States, Alaska and Hawaii are identified in
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Figure 2.1. The predominance is established from historical
 
observations.
 
Each coastal region is menaced by different naturally
 
occurring meteorological phenomena.
 
The Atlantic Coastal. Zone is under the strong
 
influence of the Bermuda subtropical high pressure center,
 
the North American land mass upstream and the warm Gulf Stream
 
immediately offshore.
 
The Gulf of Mexico Coastal Zone is under the strong
 
influence of the interaction between the uniformly warm Gulf
 
waters and cold air outbreaks from the North American
 
continent.
 
The Pacific Coastal Zone is under the strong
 
influence of the oceanic moisture upstream, the cold coastal
 
upwellings and the position and intensity of the Pacific
 
subtropical high-pressure center and the Aleutian low pressure
 
center.
 
The Alaskan Coastal Zone is under the strong in­
fluence of extratropical storms which move into the Gulf of
 
Alaska from the west southwest.
 
The Hawaiian Coastal Zone is influenced by
 
hurricanes originating off Central America; semitropical Kona
 
storms and during the wintertime by long-period swells,
 
initiated by storms between Kamchatka and the Aleutian
 
Islands.
 
Extratropical
 
Storm Surges.
 
Extratrop­
ical Winds
 
and Waves
 
Extratropical Winds
and Waves
 
Extratropical Storm
 
'"Surges
 
Thunderstorm
 
Surf 
 Surf 	 / Hurricane Winds and Waves 
o> Winds and Waves
 
Tsunamis
 
Hurricane Storm Surges
 
Hurricane Winds and Waves
 
Hurricant,
 
Winds anL Waves
 
Pigure 2.1 	 Predominant Coastal Zone Natural Phenomena
 
Producing Economic Losses
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2.4.2 	 The Relative Eonomic Importance of the
 
Loss Producing Natural Phenomena
 
Table 2.3 identifies the relative economic impor­
tance of the principal natural phenomena to different coas­
tal zones. As a result of these various phenomena and their
 
phenomenology, the potential exists for 
reducing avoidable
 
economic loss 
through prediction of events and dissemination
 
of the prediction data.
 
This historical documentation and the precision
 
of economic loss estimates of events associated with the
 
identifiable predominant natural phenomena is 
far from com­
plete. 
 The next section will discuss the data available and
 
attempt to quantify the magnitudes of the losses associated
 
with various phenomena.
 
2.4.3 	 Coastal Zone Economic Loss Data
 
Two distinct sets of data descriptive of coastal
 
zone economic losses were sought. One set would be useful
 
in establishing the losses resulting from the various destruc­
tive natural phenomena, the other would provide loss relation­
ships that would arise as a consequence of the destructive
 
natural phenomena being inadequately predicted. The latter
 
data is then concerned with establishing losses associated with
 
warning, 	in particular with respect to hurricane warning.
 
2.4.3.1 	 Economic Losses Resulting from Destructive
 
Natural Phenomena in the Coastal Zones of
 
the United States
 
Because of the scope involved, neither a comprehen­
sive survey nor an economic analysis of coastal zone losses
 
23 Table 	2.3 Relative Economic Loss importance of Naturally
 
Occurring Phenomena in Coastal Zone Regions
 
Order Cause 

ATLANTIC
 
i. 	 Hurricane Stor Surges 

2. 	 High Winds and Wind 

Waves 

3. 	 Severe Thunderstorm 

Winds 

4. 	 Extrat=opical Storm 

Surges 

5. 	 High Surf 

S. 	 Tsunamis 

GULF OF 

1. 	 Hurricane Stor= Surges 
2. 	 Higa winds and Wind 

Waves 

3. 	 Severe Thunderstorm 

wind. 

4. 	 Sigh Surf 

5. 	 Extratropical Stor= 

Surges
 
S. 	 Tsunamis 

PACIFIC 
1. 	 High Winds and Wind 

Waves 

2. 	 High Surf 

3. 	 Tsunamis 

4. 	 Extrat=opical Storm 

Surges 

0. 	 Severe Thunderstorm 
Winds 
6. 	 TzOpical Storm Surge 

ALASKA
 
i. 	 High Winds and Wind 
Waves
 
2. 	 Mxtratropical Stor= 

Surges 

3. 	 High Surf 

4. 	 Tsunamis 

o. 	 Severe Thunde.storm 

Winds 
6. Tropical Storm Surges 

Remarks
 
Entire Atlantic Coast is
 
vulnerable
 
primarily tropical origin 
extratropical lorth of 
Hattaeras 
Chesapeake Bay notorious 
for number of boats
 
swamped
 
?rimarily North of 
Hattaras
 
Relatively rare from 
extratropical storms ­
primarily from hurricane 
Extremely rare, but
 
possible
 
M EX 	I Co
 
Tallahassee to Corpus
 
Christi
 
Primarily ith hurricanes
 
but occasionally wita cold
 
fronts 
Entire coastal zone
 
vulnerable
 
Pr~marzly from hurricanes
 
Rare
 
Extremely rare
 
Zxtratrocical or:gin - both
 
stor= centers and cold
 
fronts
 
From distant Pacif:c storms.
 
California suffers osat
 
damage.
 
Aleutian, samcata and
 
South Sifiquases.

Quite 	rare because of
 
bathymetry
 
Rare compared to Atlantic
 
and Gulf Coasts
 
Essentially no tareat
 
xt=ratropical str= or-gzn 
Gulf of Alaska and Hering
 
Sea Coasts in areas where
 
batyme=try :s favorable
 
All coasts Wnere bathymetry 
is .avorabl; e.ra.t=opical 
origin 
Quakes :n both Northern and 
Southern Pacific 
Very rare 
No threat
 
1. 	 High Surf 

2. 	 Sigh Winds and Wind 
Waves 
3. 	 Tsunamis 
4. 	 severe Thunderstorm 

Winds 
5. 	 storm Surges 

North coasts; ex.tracropiral 
origin 
<ona storms and cold fronts; 
very rarely from trop:cal 
storm or hurricane 
Quakes i. both Nort.ac= and 
Southern Pacific 
Coparatively rare
 
Little or no tnre&.
 
HA'WA II
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during the past century was undertaken. Statistical data
 
was 
found, however, relating to four principal natural phe­
nomena which produce coastal zone damage. This data is lo­
cated in Appendix A.l, Tropical Cyclones; Appendix A.2, Ex­
tratropical Storms; Appendix A.3, Tsunamis; 
Appendix A.4,
 
Surf and Appendix A.5, Coastal Monterey, California, USCG
 
Calls for Assistance.
 
From this data Table 2.4 was derived, showing an­
nual economic loss estimates in the United States coastal zones.
 
For tropical cyclones, the average loss of life from
 
1964 to 1974, from Appendix A.l, is 55 and the average damage
 
category is slightly greater than number 8 which ranges from
 
$50 million to $500 million.
 
The Appendix also shows that an average of 3.6 trop­
ical storms reach the Atlantic or Gulf coast land boundaries
 
each year, and that an average of 1.8 storms per year strike
 
the coast with winds of hurricane intensity 
(65 knots or great­
er). in the United States, an average of 67 lives are lost
 
each year with a maximum of 600 in one year (1938). The loss
 
of life outside the United States i-s 
much greater.
 
During six of the years, the total property loss
 
exceeded $500,000,000 and during twelve years the losses 
were
 
between $50,000,000 and $500,000,000. Only three of the years
 
since 1941 had losses under $5,000,000. The damage total in
 
Louisiana from Hurricane Betsy (1965) was estimated to be
 
$1.2 billion.
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Table 2.4 	 Annual Economic Loss Estimates
 
in Coastal Zones of U. S.
 
Property Losses ($ millions) 
Origin Loss of Life 
- Low Average High 
Tropical Cyclones 55 50 200 500
 
(1964-1974)
 
Extratropical unreliable 75 100 200
 
Storms
 
Tsunamis 5 .5 1 1.5
 
Surf unreliable 20 26 50
 
Total 	 145.5 327 751.5
 
The data on extratropical storms, Appendix A.2, is not
 
as clearly documented as is the data for tropical cyclones, be­
cause these storms are usually much less spectacular and less
 
concentrated.
 
The literature contains accounts of extratropical su­
perstorms, however. The famous November storm of 1913 cost 200
 
lives and $2,000,000 damage on the Great Lakes and $70,000,000
 
overall damage to the Eastern United States. The great November
 
storm of 1950 took 160 lives and caused damages exceeding
 
$70,000,000. The Veterans Day storm of 1968 cost 28 lives and
 
$20,000,000 in insurable fixed losses not including damages to
 
boats and fishing gear. (Lobster trap losses were estimated at
 
75 percent.) While these superstorms are most spectacular and
 
best remembered, countless smaller extratropical storms exact a
 
very great toll each year.
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The figures quoted in Table 2.4, for extratropical
 
storms are a judgmental estimate of the combination of ex­
tratropical superstorms and normal storms.
 
From Appendix A.3 the damage caused by tsunamis
 
has been estimated, based on averages of the numbers provided
 
by the quoted references, this being the best estimate possi­
ble with the data available. The data relating to surf damage
 
in Appendix A.4 is not comprehensive and reports damage esti­
mates ranging from $1-$1.5 million to $125 million. The
 
annual estimates for surf damage in Table 2.4 are judgmental.
 
Overall, from these four principal natural origins
 
the United States coastal zones are estimated to undergo annual
 
losses ranging from $145 million to $752 million. The esti­
mates are considered to be conservative yet there is a great
 
deal of difficulty in finding precise values to assign to
 
losses 	resulting from storm damage in general.
 
2.4.4 	 Economic Losses Which are a Consequence
 
of Destructive Natural Phenomena in the
 
Coastal Zones of the United States
 
Hurricanes are quite significant natural phenom­
ena which produce considerable coastal zone damage on the Gulf
 
and East coasts of the United States. The coincidence of
 
substantial winds, torrential rain and the high seawater lev­
els or 	storm surge is responsible for a wide variety of de­
struction and damage. The hurricane disaster potential is
 
summarized in Appendix A.6, and the estimated economic losses
 
they produce is substantial.
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The process of formation of a hurricane is a
 
lengthy one and can be observed at sea. Since their destruc­
tive potential is well known, a hurricane watch is established
 
by the National Weather Service. The objective of the watch
 
is to generate appropriate forewarning of the expected inter­
action of the hurricane with the United States coastal zones.
 
Precautions can then be taken in the interaction region which
 
will effect reduction of loss of life, loss of property and
 
damage to property.
 
Currently, a warning provides 12 hours of daylight
 
preparation time; it is issued 15-18 hours before estimated
 
landfall and the warning extends over 200-300 miles of
 
coastal region. On the average, hurricane force winds extend
 
over a distance of 50 miles from the storm center, but because
 
the average error in a 24-hour forecast is about 100 miles,
 
the current warning distance is necessary to accomodate the
 
objectives of warning.
 
If the objectives of warning are to be successfully
 
achieved, within the warning region specified the population
 
and its services must disrupt their normal activities and en­
gage in the implementation of precautionary actions. These
 
actions involve expenditures of many kinds. To the extent
 
that our current knowledge and capabilities result in a lar­
ger warned region than is necessary, so must expenditures be
 
incurred by the national population that are not necessary.
 
In addition, skepticism of the warning quality results in a
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lack of precautionary measures by the population which 
can
 
possibly result in damage being produced needlessly by a
 
hurricane. Together the lack of predictive quality in the
 
hurricane's interaction with the coastal 
zone can be respon­
sible directly and indirectly for economic losses that are
 
avoidable.
 
2.4.4.1 Case Study Results
 
Early in the case 
study it was decided to attempt to
 
verify hurricane precautionary costs found in the literature
 
through local studies to be carried out in selected geograph­
ical areas. 
 In choosing the areas, it was desirable that they
 
have a history of having been struck relatively frequently
 
by hurricanes and that their damage potential be reasonably
 
high. Figure 2.2 shows coastal areas that were struck by ten
 
or more hurricanes in the years from 1886 
to 1970 [1] . Fig­
ure 2.3 presents the potential for damage along the 
coast
 
in terms of percent of residential property damage expected
 
per year due to 
wind and rain damage from tropical storms
 
and hurricanes [17]. On 
the basis of this information, the
 
areas shown in Table 2.5 
were chosen as study candidates.
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Figure 2.2-	 sections of Coast Experiencing
 
More Than Ten Hurricanes From
 
1886-1970 
30 
% / - 6 
.
 0.25 =i0.5s property value per year
 
Figure 2.3 	 Average Annual Risk of Hurricane
 
and Tropical Storm Damage
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Table 2.5 Locations Chosen for Local Studies
 
Hurricane 
 Loss 	 Regional

Frequency 
 Potential 
 Character
 
Dade and Broward 

Metropolitan,
Counties, Florida 

.15 High Residential,
 
Tourist
 
New Orleans,
 
Eastern Louisiana, 

Metropolitan,

and 	Mi.ssissippi 

.10 	 High Residential,

Coast 
 Industrial
 
North Carolina
 
Coast between 

Small towns,
Wilmington and 
 .11 	 Moderate Residential,

north boundary 
 Coastal plains
 
Dade County, Florida,* was the first case study
 
to be investigated. Interviews 
were conducted with the
 
following persons:
 
1. 	 Manager of 
the 	Dade County Metro Government
 
2. 	 Director of Dade County Civil Defense
 
3. 	 Coordinator of Civil Defense for Dade,

Broward and Monroe Counties
 
4. 	 Head of General Services Administration for
 
Dade County; 
also serving as Director of
 
Dade County Office of Emergency Preparedness
 
5. 	 Director of the Metropolitan Dade County

Planning Department.
 
The persons interviewed had little idea of what precautionary
 
costs for 
a hurricane 
in Dade County would be; nor did they
 
know who might have this information.
 
Dade County and Miami, 
its major city, have a metro
 
form of government.
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Preliminary efforts were made in the other local study areas
 
to obtain costs of preparing for hurricanes. It soon be­
came apparent that such information is not readily available;
 
therefore, it was decided to rely on the literature to esti­
mate hurricane precautionary costs.
 
It has been estimated [18] that only 20 percent
 
of the residents in a hurricane warning area take protective
 
measures such as erecting storm shelters. A later study [19]
 
argued that more credible warning would induce a larger per­
centage of the populace to take actions to inhibit storm
 
damage. While this seems reasonable there is little knowl­
edge available to quantify the variables involved. For
 
example, if the overwarned area is reduced by 50 percent,
 
how many more people would take precautions? With hurri­
cane return rates running from seven to 16 years along the
 
coastline, how long would it take for the populace in 
a
 
given area to notice the improvement in warning effective­
ness? It has been found that the experience of having been
 
in a severe hurricane results in people paying more attention
 
to warnings issued in the near future. For example, after
 
the residents of Lower C&meron Parish, Louisiana, had been
 
through Hurricane Audrey (1957), over 97 percent of them
 
evacuated in accordance with the warning issued for Carla
 
(1961) [20]. This was due not to an increased accuracy in
 
the warning system, but to the fact that the same people had
 
recently experienced a direct strike by a strong hurricane.
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The only economic loss reduction mechanism that
 
will be considered in this case study of improved hurricane
 
forecasting will be that associated with the reduction of
 
precautionary costs as the size of the warning zone is re­
duced.
 
In order to estimate the loss reductions, a number
 
of assumptions will be made as listed below.
 
1. 	 On the average, about one and one-half
 
hurricanes strike the coastline being
 
considered per year.
 
2. The number of totally false alarms, where
 
a hurricane warning is issued and no
 
hurricane-force winds touch the coastline,
 
is small enough to be ignored (<<10 percent).
 
3. Population in the hurricane-affected areas
 
is likely to grow between 10 percent and
 
30 percent by 1985.
 
4. 	 Reduction in coastline overwarning will be
 
a minimum of 10 percent and a maximum of
 
50 percent by 1985.
 
5. 	 The cost of overwarning is directly
 
proportional to population.
 
In estimating economic loss reductions, current
 
dollar (1975) values will be used. Maximum and minimum val­
ues for pertinent variables will be estimated to calculate
 
ranges. The basic economic data for overwarning costs have
 
been taken from a classic paper written by Sugg [181.
 
The formula used to calculate the range of estimated
 
loss reductions from reducing the overwarned area is
 
C1D1 BW C2 D2 P2 
 (1)
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where
 
C 1 and C 2 are low and high dollar values of the
 
cost of overwarning per year [18], respectively,
 
adjusted to 1975 dollar values, for 1.5 hurri­
canes per year.
 
D 1 and D 2 are low and high estimates of how much
 
the overwarned areas may be decreased.
 
P1 and P2 are low and high projections of pop­
ulation growth until 1985 in the areas of interest.
 
B W represents the annual loss reduction in
 
1975 dollars.
 
The 1966 costs of overwarning for 1.5 hurricanes
 
per annum were projected to 1975 [18J. The minimum and
 
maximum projected costs were, respectively, S!0,400,000 and
 
$34,900,000. An inflation factor of 20 percent was used in
 
making this projection, however, this factor was more near
 
50 percent [22]. Modifying the numbers [18] to reflect
 
the true effect of inflation leads to the following values
 
of C1 and C 2 to use in Equation (1):
 
C1 = $13,000,000
 
C 2 = $43,600,000. 
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The 1975 population projections used [18] were accurate enough
 
to need no revision. U.S. Department of Commerce data [23] was
 
used to estimate 1985 population in the affected areas. It is
 
estimated that growth between 1975 and 1985 in these areas is
 
likely to be between 10 and 30 percent on the average, keeping
 
in mind that the most vulnerable areas, those near the coastline
 
may be even higher; thus, P1 = 1.1 and P 2 = 1.3. Current fore­
casting methods are not likely to decrease the length of
 
overwarned coastline included in a warning by more than 10 per­
cent; thus, D 1 = 0.1. If the numerical models prove to be
 
useful and better data gathering capability is brought to bear,
 
it is possible that the overwarned area may be decreased by
 
one-half, D2 = 0.5. Using these values in Equation (1)
 
yields 	estimated loss reductions from shrinkage of the warning
 
zone to lie between $1,430,000 and $28,000.000 per year. The
 
assumptions and results are summarized in Table 2.6.
 
2.4.5 	 Economic'Loss Reductions Through
 
Hurricane Modification
 
to:
Conceiv&bly, a hurricane could be modified 

1. 	 Change its path
 
2. 	 Lower its peak winds and, therefore, diminish
 
its destructiveness.
 
no evidence that the path of a hurricane can
To date, there is 

that it would miss land or strike in
be predictably altered so 

a less populated area. A theoretical-experimental base, how­
ever, does exist for decreasing its peak winds thereby, amwl­
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Table 2.6 Estimated Range of Cost
 
Reduction Due to Improved Hurricane
 
Forecasting - 1985
 
Estimated Value
 
Parameter
 
Minimum Maximum
 
Cost of overwarning
 
(millions of 1975 dollars) C1 13 C 2 43.6
 
Fraction by which overwarned D D = 01D 0.52
 
area may be decreased 1
 
Ratio of coastal population
 
= 1.3
P1 1. P2
in 1985 to current coastal 

population
 
Estimated minimum cost reduction = C D P 1 $ 1.4 million 
Estimated maximum cost reduction = C 2 D2 P 2 $28 million 
iorating the destructive effects of both wind and storm surge.
 
It has been shown [21] that the height of the hurricane-induced
 
storm surge depends directly on the peak wind radius from the
 
storm center and inversely on the pressure drop across the
 
storm, among other factors.
 
The theoretical-experimental base is called hur­
ricane modification, a technique of seeding hurricanes with
 
silver iodide crystals, whose experimental results to date
 
are promising but not proven.
 
Under Project Stormfury, a joint project of DOC and
 
DOD, four Atlantic hurricanes have been seeded with indefi­
nite results. Seeding of Hurricane Debbie (1969) produced
 
REPRODUCIBILITY OF THE 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS POOR 
37
 
results compatible with expectations, a decrease in wind speed
 
of 10-20 percent. The effect of seeding appears to last only
 
about 24 hours. The first seeding reduced peak winds by
 
30 percent, the second seeding by 15 percent [13]'. Practi­
cally continuous seeding to landfall may be required. Although
 
theory would indicate a reduction in hurricane-induced surge,
 
no significant reduction has been observed.
 
At the start of Project Stormfury, seeding of the inner
 
eyewall clouds was considered to be most desirable. Since
 
then, however, further understanding of hurricane dynamics and
 
computer simulations of seeding experiments have revised this
 
thinking. Currently, seeding outside the eyewall is expected
 
to produce the most beneficial results. The simulations
 
leading to this result were conducted on a two-dimensional
 
model of a hurricane isolated from larger-scale atmospheric
 
phenomena. Development and verification of a three-dimensional
 
hurricane model embedded in a general circulation model will
 
enable more realistic simulation of hurricane modification
 
techniques, and will be a valuable tool in an integrated
 
program of hurricane modification experimentation.
 
In 1972 DOD withdrew support from Project Stormfury;
 
this action-led to a 5-year hiatus in seeding experiments.
 
Seeding flights are not expected to resume until 1977 when
 
the project will be moved to the Pacific Ocean where there are
 
more experimental targets since considerably more tropical
 
cyclones occur in the Pacific than in the Atlantic.
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The entire question of operational hurricane
 
modification 
(as well as that of weather modification in
 
general) has many unresolved political and legal questions.
 
Currently, to avoid these questions, Project Stormfury has
 
criteria to be met before a 
storm is seeded. One criterion
 
is that no storm is seeded that is expected to reach land
 
within 24 hours. Since the effects of seeding appear to be
 
negated within a 24-hour period, this criterion will have to
 
be modified before operational testing through landfall 
can
 
be undertaken.
 
2.4.5.1 Case Study Results
 
The potential loss reduction resulting from hurricane
 
modification will be derived employing the following
 
assumptions:
 
1. 	 Political and legal objections and obstructions
 
to the use of hurricane modification
 
techniques will be resolved to the extent
 
required to make hurricane seeding an
 
operational technique.
 
2. 	 Project Stormfury will demonstrate that
 
hurricane seeding is effective by 1985 and an
 
operational program of hurricane seeding will
 
be in use.
 
3. 	 A maximum of 50 percent and a minimum of
 
10 percent of all hurricanes making landfall
 
will be seeded.
 
4. Of those hurricanes seeded, the average
 
decrease in peak winds will lie between 5 and
 
20 percent.
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5. 	 Damage caused by hurricanes can be allocated
 
approximately 60 percent to storm surge and
 
.40 	percent to the effects of wind and rain
 
[5 and 6J.
 
6. 	 Economic loss in the affected area is
 
directly proportional to population.
 
7. 	 Population in the hurricane-affected areas
 
is likely.to grow between 10 percent and
 
30 percent by 1985.
 
8. 	 The influence of seeding on hurricane­
induced storm surge will not be considered.
 
9. 	 Economic loss is assumed to be directly
 
proportional to wind force.
 
Suppose D is the annual damage resulting from all
 
hurricanes that landfall. Then, from assumption (5) 0.4D is
 
the annual damage resulting from wind and rain. Let P be
 
the ratio of the population in coastal regions influenced
 
relative to today's population in the same zone. Then, under
 
assumption (6) the annual damage from wind and rain is 0.4DP.
 
Suppose that S is the fraction of all hurricanes that will
 
be seeded from those that make landfall. Then, the damage
 
associated with these hurricanes before seeding is D s 0.4DPS.
 
Seeding is assumed to reduce the peak winds of those
 
hurricanes seeded. Let the ratio of the peak wind without
 
seeding to the peak wind with seeding of a given hurricane be 
Q Then the ratio of wind force without seeding to the wind 
force after seeding is Q 2 
40
 
The 	damage associated with the seeded hurricanes,
 
0. 4DPS
 Q2 
using assumption (9) ,is therefore D 

The loss reduction resulting from seeding, L S , is 
therefore, 
L S 	 = D S - DSQ 
= 0.4DPS [ 1 	- 1/Q 2
 i.e., L S 

in the 1960s the damage produced by all hurricanes
 
in the United States was estimated to be $450 million. From
 
applying an inflation correction factor [22], the value of
 
this damage in 1975 would be $675 million. Hence D = $675
 
million.
 
From assumption (7) by 1985 1.1 < P < 1.3 From 
assumption (3), 0.1 < S < 0.5 - From assumption (4) 
1 > Q > I , therefore, 0.8 < Q < 0.95 
0.8 	- - 0.95 
The bounds of the loss reduction are then given in
 
$ millions by
 
(0.1) (0. 4 x 675) (1.1) [1 ( .95)2] 
(0.4 	 x 675)(1.3)[1 
- (0.8) 2 (0.5) 
or
 
$2.9 million < L < $63.2 million.
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2.4.6 Coastal Zone E~o~nomic Benefits
 
2.4.6.1 Benefits Related to Destructive Phenomena
 
Historical data has been examined to quantify the loss
 
of life and the property damage resulting directly from the
 
four principal natural phenomena which can be destructive in
 
the United States coastal zones. Since the assignment of a
 
dollar value to loss of life always is controversial, this
 
loss will be excluded. Property losses were estimated to
 
range annually from $146 million to $752 million in 1975.
 
These property losses are some undefined mix of avoidable
 
and nonavoidable losses. The avoidable losses being those
 
which appropriate warning could mitigate, assuming that the
 
population involved took every appropriate precautionary
 
and preparatory action. What fraction of property losses
 
are actually avoidable is evidently difficult to deduce.
 
For a hurricane, it has been suggested that 60 percent of the
 
damage results from the induced storm surge, 40 percent from
 
wind and rain. It seems reasonable to assume that avoidable
 
more those that result from lack of control of the
losses are 

sea rather than the wind and the rain. Judgmentally, therefore,
 
with proper capability to predict the sea's behavior, perhaps
 
one-half of the losses associated with storm surge or 30 per­
cent of the whole of the losses might be avoidable.
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Tsunamis prediction is generally considered to be
 
very good; it may therefore be reasonably argued that the
 
tsunamis losses sustained are not avoidable. The losses
 
resulting from surf and substantial breakers are perhaps
 
50 percent avoidable with adequate predictive knowledge
 
and a capacity to implement the measures needed to endure
 
the pounding generated by the breakers. The avoidable
 
losses are the basis of benefits to the coastal zone. The
 
economic losses of Table 2.4 are translated into benefits,
 
as shown below, using the judgmental avoidable loss factors
 
discussed in Table 2.7.
 
Table 2.7 Estimated Annual Maximum Benefits from Direct
 
Action of Destructive Phenomena
 
Total Property Avoidable Estimated
 
Loss Estimated Loss Maximum Benefits
 
$ millions Factor $ millions
 
Low Average High Low Average High
 
Tropical Cyclones 50 200 500 0.3 15 60 150
 
Extratropical storms 75 100 200 0.3 23 30 60
 
Tsunamis 0.5 1 1.5 0 0 0 0
 
Surf 20 26 50 0.5 10 13 25
 
Total 146 327 752 48 103 
 235
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These benefits, by 1985, can be assumed to be de­
pendent on relative population density in the coastal 
zone
 
regions. The population factor can range from 1.1 to 1.3.
 
Thus, in 1985 the maximum potential benefit related to di­
rect action of destructive phenomena may range from $53
 
million to $306 million per 
annum.
 
2.4.6.2 	 Benefits Related to Hurricane
 
Characteristics
 
Two additional cost reductions were attributed to
 
better hurricane prediction and knowledge. A cost reduction
 
range was determined, assuming that the predicted hurricane
 
landfall 	would be improved. This cost reduction is 
in the
 
expenditures needed to make preparation to prevent hurricane
 
damage and loss of life. This 
cost reduction is therefore
 
an avoidable loss directly related to 
improved prediction and
 
is a distinct benefit additional to those resulting from the
 
actual phenomena of the storm. These benefits in 1985 were
 
estimated to range from $1.4 million to $28 million per 
annum.
 
Finally, hurricane modification was considered, the
 
result of which is to reduce the 
amount of damage that can be
 
produced by a hurricane. This is a prevention measure 
based on
 
plausible theoretical physics but for which the experimental
 
implementation technology remains unproven and undeveloped
 
today. It is assumed, however, that by 1985 
the seeding tech­
niaue will reduce the losses produced by hurricanes and give
 
rise to benefits which range from $2.9 million to 
$63 million,
 
since hurricane seeding makes 
the losses avoidable.
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The total annual benefits and the origins of
 
these benefits are tabulated in Table 2.8.
 
The exact magnitude of the benefits that will be
 
realized is difficult to assess. Prediction improvement
 
clearly can generate benefits when economic losses can be
 
avoided by a change in procedures according to what is pre­
dicted. That is, the change in procedure is itself the pre­
ventative measure.
 
Table 2.8 
 Coastal Zone Annual Benefits
 
and Their Origins
 
Estimated Annual Benefit Range
 
Benefit Origin ($ millions)
 
Minimum Maximum
 
Improved prediction of
 
destructive phenomena 
 53* 306*
 
produced sea conditions
 
Improved prediction of
 
hurricane landfall 
 1.4 28
 
Effective seeding of
 
hurricanes that will 
 2.9 63
 
landfall
 
Total coastal zone
 
benefits 1985 
 57 397
 
* These benefits require reduction by the cost and maintenance
 
of the required prevention measures.
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When naturally occurring phenomena have a destructive
 
potential, knowledge and prediction of the occurrence of des­
tructive characteristics of the phenomena implies the imple­
mentation of physical preventative measures with which a
 
cost is associated. The cost of prevention and the mainten­
ance of prevention reduces the essential annual bene-fit pro­
vided by knowledge and the capacity to predict the 
occurrence
 
of destructive characteristics of the phenomena of importance.
 
Both hurricane landfall prediction and effective hurricane
 
seeding provide benefits that are from procedural changes.
 
The benefits associated with direct losses from destructive
 
phenomena imply some undefined additional preventative expen­
ditures. With the assumptions of this case study, estimated
 
annual benefits ranging from $4 million to $91 million seem,
 
therefore, clearly acceptable but the possibility of achieving
 
the full range of benefits from $57 million to $397 million
 
seems doubtful or requires further study to generate the iden­
tity of the benefits.
 
2.4.6.3 Benefit Estimates Exclusive to 
SENSAT Data
 
The benefits derived will result from a wide variety
 
of data and information only some part of which will come di­
rectly from SEASAT's operational instrumentation.
 
The SEASAT measurements of greatest interest to
 
coastal zone~phenomena prediction are:
 
a Surface winds
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* Surface waves
 
e Atmospheric profiles of temperature and moisture
 
M Topography
 
C 
 Surface temperature
 
* Sea ice
 
rhii- is data which will feed into the many excellent numerical
 
aoda12-7 that now exist. The following models all have application
 
-0u his problem.
 
o 	 Marine Wind Analysis Model (FNWC)
 
* 	 Atmospheric Forecast Models with Boundary Layer
 
Attachments (NOAA, FNWC, AFGWC)
 
* 	 Ocean Circulation Model (Princeton/Bryan)
 
o 	 Hydrodynamic Numerical Models (EPRF)
 
* 	 Surface Current Analysis/Forecasting Models
 
(EPRF, FNWC)
 
* 	 Thermal Structure Analysis/Forecasting Models
 
(FNWC, EPRF)
 
* 	 Heat Exchange Models (EPRF)
 
& 	 Spectral Wave Models (FNWC, EPRF, NYU, NAVOCEANO) 
* 	 Ocean Tidal Models (NOAA, EPRF)
 
o 	 Dispersion/Diffusion Models for Pollutants
 
(IPA, EPRF)
 
5 	 Search and Rescue Models (USCG, EPRF, FNWC)
 
* 	 Ocean Frontal Analysis/Prediction Models (NASA,
 
FNWC)
 
* 	 Acoustic Propagation Models (AESD)
 
a 	 Storm Surge Models (NOAA, EPRF)
 
* 	 Surf Prediction Models (NOAA, FNWC)
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SEASAT will contribute data that will significantly
 
improve data coverage in both space and time.
 
Tropical storms with the potential to become hurricanes
 
are characterized by data collected from satellites and reconnais­
sance aircraft. These data are used at the National Hurricane
 
Center (NHC) in Miami to predict the landfall using a number of
 
prediction models 17 to 11] . Most techniques fit the current
 
storm to historical storms and predict the present storm's posi­
tion at various prediction intervals such as 24, 48 and 72 hours.
 
"Statistical Prediction of the National Hurricane Center" [24]
 
summarizes the various prediction techniques currently being used
 
at NHC. A number of techniques are necessary since no single one
 
of them is applicable to all hurricanes. The hurricane forecaster,
 
after examining the predictions given by the different techniques,
 
must exercise his experience and judgment to choose which output,
 
or combination of outputs, to use as the forecast.
 
Significant improvement in landfall prediction will re­
quire operational dynamic simulations of hurricanes, for which a
 
model is under development at the National Meteorological Center
 
(NMC) at Camp Springs, Maryland.
 
Operational tests with actual hurricane data will be
 
run on a 60 km grid model this summer as the first step in veri­
fying its applicability to improving forecasting. Even if these
 
tests are satisfactory, it will take an extended period of time
 
to develop enough confidence in this, or any new, model for it
 
Lo be used by the forecasters at NHC.
 
PIhEOIDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMUE 
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A 10 km model will then be embedded in the 60 km model
 
and interact with it. The computational capacity to enable this
 
level of simulation is not expected to be available for several
 
years. In studying the data input problem, NMC has computer
run 

experiments to determine solution sensitivity to re­the various 

quired data [14] and accurate identification of the initial and
 
three-dimensional wind field has been identified 
as the most
 
important input requirement for the NMC 60 km grid model. The
 
10 km grid model will permit simulation of the hurricane eye­
wall and other small scale dynamics that are significant to
 
the understanding of the hurricane seeding process.
 
Thus, development and verification of three-dimensional,
 
numerical hurricane simulations will be invaluable to hurricane
 
forecasting and investigation of hurricane modification, but these
 
simulations will require large amounts of accurate input data for
 
initialization. An operational SEASAT will be able 
to provide
 
some of these data.
 
One of the best ways of showing how SEASAT would
 
contribute to coastal zone phenomena prediction is through
 
an influence matrix in terms of these major numerical models,
 
which SEASAT would influence. Table 2.9 is a matrix showing
 
the relative importance of the measurements to the numerical
 
models.
 
Judgmentally, from this influence matrix and from fa­
miliarity with the computer models, 
it has been estimated that
 
Table 2.9 Model 

I Surface 
Model Winds 
Marine Wand Analysis Modol 4 
PE Atmospheric Forecast Model 3 
Oc !an Circulation Model 4 
Hydrodynamic Numerical Models 4 
surface Current Models 4 

Thermal Struct.ure Models 1 

Heat Exchange Models 4 
Spucral Wave nodels 4 
Ocean Tidal Models 0 
Dispersion/Diffusion Models 4 
Search and Rescue Models 4 
Ocean Front Models 3 
Acoustlc Propagation Models 0 
Storm Surge Models 4 
Surf Models 0 
Code: 4 Critical Direct Influence 
3 Major Direct Influence 
2 Minor Direct Influence 
I Slight Direct Influence 
0 No Influence 
Influence 

Su-F ace j 
Waves 
0 

2 
2 

I 0 
3 

3 

( 
4 
0 

4 

4 
1 

4 

3 

4 

for SEASAT Measurements 
SCASAT Measurement 
Atmcsphere Surface 
Pronides Topography Temperature 
0 0 2 
4 0 3 
U 4 3 
0 3 0 
C, 4 3 
0 2 4 
3 0 4 
3 0 1 
0 3 0 
0 0 3 
0 0 3 
0 3 4 
0 0 4 
0 3 0 
0 
Sea 
Ice 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
2 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
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SEASAT would exclusively contribute 30 percent of the benefits
 
that have been derived through its unique data contribution.
 
Tentatively, clearly acceptable coastal zone economic
 
benefits exclusive to SEASAT are suggested to range from $1 mil­
lion to $27 million annually, which the full range of benefits
 
from $17 million to $119 million annually* seems doubtful without
 
further study.
 
2.4.6.4 Coastal Zone Benefits Generalized in Time
 
Between 1985 and 2000, continued population growth in
 
the coastal zones could be suggested but it is not clear that this
 
will be the case at this time. It seems reasonable co assume
 
that benefits derived will be realistic for each year from 1985
 
to 2000. The annual benefits resulting from this case study are
 
tabulated in Table 2.10.
 
2.4.6.5 Integrated Benefits
 
The annual benefits of Table 2.10 will be integrated
 
over the time interval 1985-2000 and will be discounted back from
 
the end of the year of origin to the beginning of 1975 at different
 
discount rates, using an integrated discount factor. The results
 
are shown in Table 2.11.
 
, 
This full range of SEASAT exclusive benefits refers to
 
Table 2.8 which estimates the total coastal zone benefits
 
in 1985 between $57 million to $397 million of which $17
 
million to $119 million represent the 30 percent of the
 
total losses which may be avoidable.
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Table 2.10 	 U.S. Coastal Zones Annual
 
Benefit 1985-2000
 
Benefit Origin 
 Annual range 1985-2000
 
$ millions
 
All data sources 
 a - 91 
Exclusive to SEASAT 
 1 - 27 
Table 2.11 Coastal Zone Integrated Benefits
 
Discount Interest Rate 0% 
 5% 10% 15%
 
Factor
 16 
 6.7073 
 3.0162 
 1.4716
 
Benefit range from 
all forecasting 64-1456 27-610 12-274 6-134 
sources ($ millions) 
Benefit range I 
exclusive to SEASAT 16-432 7-181 3-81 1-40
 
date ($ millions)
 
53
 
COASTAL ZONE CASE STUDY REFERENCES
 
1. 	 Simpson, R. H. and M. B. Lawrence, "Atlantic Hurricane Fre­
quencies Along the U. S. Coastline," NOAA Technical Memor­
andum NWS SR-58, U. S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic
 
and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service,
 
Southern Region, Fort Worth, Texas, June 1971.
 
2. 	 Suggs, A. L., L. G. Pardue and R. L. Carrodus, "Memorable
 
Hurricanes of the United States Since 1873," NOAA Technical
 
Memorandum NWS SR-56, U. S. Department of Commerce, National
 
Oceanic and ALmospheric Administration, National Weather Ser­
vice, Southern Region, Fort Worth, Texas, April 1971.
 
3. 	 "The Virginia Floods, August 19-22, 1969," a report to the
 
Administrator, U. S. Department of Commerce, Environmental
 
Science Services Administrator, September 1969.
 
4. 	 Frank, Dr. N. L., "The Hard Facts About Hurricanes," NOAA
 
Magazine, U. S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and
 
Atmospheric Administration, July 1974.
 
5. 	 Simpson, R. H., Hurricane Prediction: Progress and Problem
 
Areas," Science, Vol. 181, September 7, 1973, p. 899.
 
6. 	 "Disaster Activities Under Public Law 875, 81st Congress,
 
Hurricane 'Carla' After-Action Report," U. S. Army Corps of
 
Engineers, Galveston District, August 1962.
 
7. 	 Miller, B. I., E. C. Hill and P. P. Chase, "Revised Technique
 
for Forecasting Hurricane Motion by Statistical Methods,"
 
Mon. Wea. Rev., Vol. 96, No. 8, August 1968, pp. 540-548.
 
8. 	 Sanders, F. and R. W. Burpee, "Experiments in Barotropic
 
Hurricane Track Forecasting," Journal of Applied Meteorology,
 
Vol. 7, No. 3, July 1968, pp. 313-323.
 
9. 	 Hope, J. R. and C. U. Neumann, "An Operational Technique for
 
Relating the Movement of Existing Tropical Cyclones to Past
 
Tracks," Mon. Wea. Rev., Vol. 98, No. 12, December 1970.
 
10. 	 Neumann, C. J., "An Alternate to HURRAN Tropical Cyclone Fore­
cast System," NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS SR-62, U. S. Depart­
ment of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra­
tion, National Weather Service, Southern Region, Fort Worth,
 
Texas, January 1972.
 
54
 
11. 	 Neumann, C. J., J. R. Hope and B. I. Miller, "A Statistical
 
Method of Combining Synoptic and Empirical Tropical Cyclone
 
Prediction Systems," NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS SR-63,
 
U. S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
 
Administration, National Weather Service, Southern Region,
 
Fort Worth, Texas, January 1972.
 
12. 	 Simpson, R. H., "The Decision Process in Hurricane
 
Forecasting," NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS, SR-53, U. S.
 
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
 
Administration, National Weather Service, Southern Region,
 
Fort Worth, Texas, January 1971.
 
13. 	 "Hurricane Prediction and Control: Impact of Large
 
Computers," Science, Vol. 181, No. 4101, August 17, 1973,
 
pp. 643-645.
 
14. 	 Hovermale, J. B., "Data Sensitivity Expfriments in a
 
Four-Dimensional Initialization Procedure for a Hurricane
 
Model," unpublished paper, 1975.
 
15. 	 Nagler, R. G. and S. W. McCandless, "Operational
 
Oceanographic Satellites, SEASAT Potentials for
 
Oceanography Climatology, Coastal Processes and Ice,"
 
preliminary draft, February 24, 1975.
 
16. 	 Personal conversation with Dr. Robert Sheets, Dir.ector,
 
Hurricane Group, National Hurricane and Experimental
 
Meteorology Laboratory, Miami, Florida, March 1975.
 
17. 	 "Weather and Extended Coverage," Final Report on a study
 
of the effects and distributions of storms producing
 
extended coverage losses prepared for the National Board
 
of Fire Underwriters by TRC Service Corporation, Hartford,
 
Connecticut, December 31, 1964.
 
18. 	 Sugg, Arnold L., "Economic Aspects of Hurricane-s,"
 
Mon. Wea. Rev., Vol. 95, No. 3, March 1967, pp. 143-146.
 
19. 	 Anderson, L. G. and j. M. Burnham, "Application of
 
Economic Analyses to Hurri'cane Warnings to Residential
 
and Retail Activities in the U. S. Gulf of Mexico Coastal
 
Region," Mon. Wea. Rev., Vol. 101, No. 2, February 1973,
 
pp. 126-131.
 
55
 
20. 	 "Disaster Preparedness," Report to the Congress, Executive
 
Office of the President, Office of Emergency Preparedness,
 
January 1972.
 
21. 	 Jelesnianski, C. -P., "SPLASH (Special Program to List
 
Amplitudes of Surges From Hurricanes), I. Landfall Storms,"
 
NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS, TDL-46, U. S. Department of
 
Commerce, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
 
Administration, National Weather Service, Systems 
 -
Development Office, Silver Spring, Maryland, April 1972.
 
22. 	 Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
 
Labor Statistics, November 1974.
 
23. 	 "1972 OBERS Projections Economic Activity in the U. S. by
 
Economic Area, Water Resources Region and Subarea, State,
 
and SMSA and Non-SMSA Portions of the Areas, Historical
 
and Projected 
- 1929-2020, Vol. 2, BEA Economic Areas,"
 
prepared by the U. S. Department of Commerce, Social and
 
Economic Statistics Administration, Bureau of Economic
 
Analysis, Regional Economic Analysis Division and the
 
U. S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service,
 
Natural Resources Economics Division for U. S. Water
 
Resources Council, Washington, D. C., April 1974.
 
24. 	 Neumann, C. J., "Statistical Prediction of the
 
National Hurricane Center," paper presented at the Third
 
Conference on Probability and Statistics in the Atmospheric

Sciences, Boulder, Colorado, June 19-22, 1973.
 
56 
APPENDIX
 
57 
A.I Tropical Cyclones
 
North Atlantic Statistical and Coastal Zone Damage Summary
 
TOTAL NUMBER OF TOTAL NUMBER LOSS CF I DAMAGE BY
TROPICAL CYCLONES* OF HURRICANES LIFE 
 CATEGORY**
 
ALL REACHING ALL REACHING TOTAL
ALL ALL TOTALUNITED UNITEDAREAS U.S. AREAS STATES ALL STATESCOAST COAST AREAS AREAS 
1931 9 2 2 0 0 
i932 11 5 6 2 0 r 
1933 21 7 9 .5 63 7 
1934 11 5 6 3 17 6 
1935 6 2 5 2 414 7 
1936 16 7 7 3 9 6 
1937 9 4 3 0 0 4 
1938 8 '3 2 600 8 
1939 5 3 3 1 3 3 
1940 8 3 4 2 51 6 
1941 6 4 4 2 10 7 
1942 10 3 4 2 17 8 7 7 
1943 10 4 5 1 19 - 16 7 7 
1944 11 4 1 7 3 1076 64 8 8 
1945 11 5 5 3 29 7 8 8 
1946 6 4 3 1 5 0 7 7 
1947 9 7 5 3 72 53 8 8 
1948 9 4 6 3 24 3 7 7' 
194, 13 3 7 2 4 4 8 8 
1950 13 4 11 3 27 19 7 7 
1951 10 1 8 0 244 0 7 6 
1952 7 2 6 1 16 3 6 6 
1953 14 6 6 2 3 2 7. 7 
1954 11 4 8 3 720+ 193 9 9 
1955 12 5 9 3 1518+ 218 9 9 
1956 8 2 4 1 76 21 8 7 
1957 8 5 3 1 475 395 8 8 
1958 10 1 7 0 49 2 7 7 
1959 11 7 7 3 57 24 7 7 
1960 7 5 41 2 185 65 8 8 
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TOTAL NUMBER OF TOTAL NUMBER LOSS OF DAMAGE BY 
TROPICAL CYCLONES* OF HURRICANES LIFE CATEGORYX* 
REACHING REACHING TOTAL TOTAL I
 
YEAR ALL U ALL 
 UNITED ALL UNITED
 AREAS U.S .RE .S.AS, ST STATES
COAST AREAS COAST AREAS AREAS ­
1961 11 3 8 1 345 46 8 8 
1962 5 1 3 0 4 4 6 6 
1963 9 1 7 1 7218+ 11 9 7 
1964 12 6 6 4 266 49 9 9 
1965 6 2 4 1 76 75 9 9 
1966 11 2 7 2 1040 54 8 7 
1967 8 2 6 1 68 18 1 8 
1968 7 3 4 1 11 9 7 7 
1969 13 3 10 2 364 256 9 9 
1970 7 A 3 1 74 11 9 8 
1971 12 5 5 3 44 8 8 8 
1972 4 3 3 1 128 121 9 9 
1973 7 1 4 0 16 5 7 7 
1974 7 1 4 1 3000+ 1 8 i 8 
TOTAL 419 159 241 78 2932
 
MEAN 9.5 3.6 5.5 1.8- 67f 
**The Environmental Data Service has for some time recognized that,
 
without detailed expert appraisal of damage, all figures published
 
are merely approximations. Since errors in dollar estimates vary'
 
in proportion to the total damage, storms are placed in categories
 
,varying from 1 to 9 as follows:
 
1. Less than $50 6. $500,000 to $5,000,000
 
2. $50 to $500 7. $5,000,000 to $50,000,000
 
3. $500 to $5,000 8. $50,000,000 to $500,000,000
 
4. $5,000 to $50,000 9. -$500,000,000 to $5,000,000,0G0
 
5. $50,000 to $500,000
 
* Including hurricanes. 
# Not reported in literature, believed minor. 
+ Additional deaths for which figures are not available.
 
DATE OF 

STORM 

1964
 
Aug 7-8 

*ABBY 

Aug 20-Sept 4' 

CLEO 

Sent 1-14 

DORA 

Sept 23-Oct 5 
HILDA 
Oct 8-17 

:SABEL 

1965 
Aug 27-Sept 12 

BETSY 

Sept 24-30 
*DEBIE 

Damage Surmary for Individual Tropical Storms and Hurricanes, Past 11 Years
 
(Atlantic and Gulf Cqcstal Zones)
 
AREAS MAXIMUM SUSTAINED DAMAGE rl 
HARDEST HIT WIND (7TS) CATEGIRY 
Texas 60 5 	 Property damage due mainly to flooding. Mata-
gorda, Tex. reported 39 kts, gusts to 56 kts. 
Florida to 122 8 Miami, rla. estimated winds at 87-91 kts with
 
Virginia gusts to 117 kts as center passed over area.
 
Tides 4-6 ft above normal. Flooding caused
 
heavy damage north to Va.
 
Florida, 108 8 Entered coast near Jacksonville, Fla. Tides 

Georgia 10-12 ft above normal. 71 kt wind recordedh
 
All major
at Jacksonville, some miles inland. 

forces (wind, tides, flooding) caused exten-

sive damage. 
Louisiana, 130 8 Over 100 kt winds hit La. coast east 'f Ver-

Georgia, million Bay. Franklin estimated 117 kts. 10 

Carolinas ft tides estimated near landfall. Over 2,600
 
dwellings demolished; all facilities offshore 

received heavy damage.
 
Florida to 78 7 Storm entered coast 47 mi NW of Miami which 
Virginia reported gusts 40-55 kts. Strong winds con­
fined to small area. Tornados caused most
 
damage. 

Southern 130 9 Most destructive hurricane on record to date. 
Florida, 120 kt winds swept Fla. Keys, 130 kt winds 
Louisiana hit La. coast. Tides of 7-9 ft above MSL hit 
Fla. Kevs and La. coast. Heavy damage to 
shipping, oil facilities and installations 
due to wind and seas. $1.2 billion damage
 
estimated in La.
 
Louisiana 45 7 	 Entered coast south of New Orleans and dis­
sipated. Damage mainly due to flooding from 
heavy rains. Tides 2-4 ft above normal. 
ItR 
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DATE OF 

STORM 

1966
 
Jun 4-13 

ALM.A 
Sept 21-Oct 11 

INEZ 

1967
 
Sept 5-22 

BEULAH 

Sept 7-19 

DORIA 

1968
 
Jun 1-10' 

ABBY 

Jun 22-24

*CANDY 

Oct 13-21 

GLADYS 

AREAS 
HARDEST HIT 

Florida, 

Southern 

Georgia 

South Florid 

Texas 

New Jersey 

Florida, 

Georgia, 

Carolinas 

Texas 

Florida 

MAXIMUM SUSTAINED 
WIND(KTS) 

125(mph) 

140 

130 

99 

67 

52 

85 

DAMAGE BY 

CATtGO'ZY
 
7 
7 

a 

4 

6 

7 

REMARKS 
75 to 100 mph winds hit Fla. coast south of
 
Tallahassee. Major damage due to tidal inun­
dation and beach erosion. 6 lives lost in Fla.
 
South Fla. and Keys %,ere main U.S. areas
 
affected by storm which did extensive damage
 
in Caribbean and Mexico. Homestead AFE re­
ported gusts to 69 kts. Tides were 2-4 ft
 
above normal in Fla. Keys.
 
Tex. received extensive crop, property damage
 
due to flooding, strong winds. 15 deaths in
 
Tex; 118 kt winds hit coast.
 
Boating accident caused 3 deaths at Ocean
 
City, N.J. Minor damage and beach erosion
 
along mid-Atlantic states.
 
Jacksonville, Fla. recorded highest winds of
 
any land station, 45 kts, gusts to 57 kts.
 
Some damage due to flooding from heavy rains
 
and tornado.
 
Tax. suffered bulk of damage with crop, pro­perty losses of $2.73 million. Strong winds,
 
high tides caused extensive coastal damage.
 
Gusts to 62 kts reported at San Antonio,Tex.
 
Tides of 3-7 ft along west coast of Fla.;
 
strong winds caused major damage. Bayport,
 
Fla. reported 73 kt winds. Damage in Fla.
 
estimated $6.7 million.
 
0 
____ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ __  ___ __ _ ___ 
DATE OF 

STOH24 

1969
 
Aug 5-22 

CA4ILLE 

Aug 21-Sept 10 

GER.DA 

Oct 1-6 

*JEN ­
1970
 
.'y 17-27 

ALMA 

Jul 19-23 

*BECKY 

Jul 23-Aug 5 

CELIA 

Sept 11-17 

*FELICE 

AREAS MAXIMUM SUSTAINED DAMAGE BY 
ARDEST HIT WIND (KTS) CATEGORY 
Mississippi, 175 9 

Louisiana, 

Virginia 

Florida, 125 

Maine 

Florida 35 

Florida, 70 

Georgia 

Florida 55 6 

Texas 113 f: 

Texas 60 

Estimated winds of 175 kts; tides up to 24.2 ft
 
abovc MSL demolished coastal towns near center
 
as giant hurricane moved inland over Miss. 256
 
deaths in U.S.; $1.42 billion in damage. Seri­
ous flooding in Va.
 
Coastal areas barely affected; only serious
 
damage occurred where storm made landfall.
 
Nantucket Lightship reported top winds 125 kts.
 
Wind gusts to 48 kts at Naples, Fla., no major

damage.
 
Remnants of storm caused only minor wind
 
damage over Ga. and S.C.
 
Damage to western Fla. due mainly to local
 
flooding. 6 ft tides (3 ft above normal) re-

Ported at Panacea, Fla..
 
Tides 9.2 and 9.0 ft above MSL recorded at
 
Port Aransas Beach and Port Aransas jetty, re­
spectively. 6 ft tides Corpus Christi to Gal­
veston Bay. 85a damage confined to Corpus
 
Christi area caused mainly by high winds. Peak
 
gusts of 140 kts recorded at Corpus Christi.
 
48,316 Tex. families suffered losses.
 
Storm entered coast 26 mi NE of Gajveston,Tex.

Only minor dam'jc as Lid were 3.9 ft above 
normal at Cameron, La. Winds of 39 kts re­
corded at Galveston.
 
___ ____ ___ ___ ____ ___ ___ ____ ___ __) 
DATE OF 
STOM-
1971
 
Aug 20-29 

*DORIA 

Sept 5-17 

EDITH 

Sept 3-13 

FERN 

Sept 5-Oct 5 

GINGE 

1972
 
Jun 14-22 

AGNES 

Aug 29-Sept 5 

*CARRIE 

1973
 
Sept 1-7 

*DELTA 

AREAS 
HARDEST HIT 
Virginia to 

Massachusett. 

Louisiana, 

Texas 

Texas 

North 

Carolina 

Florida to 

New York 

Massachusett 

Texas 

MAXIMUM SUSTAINED 

WIND (KTS) 

55 

140 

80 

90 

75 

60 

60 

DAMCE 	 BY 
CATE:GORY REMARKS 
8 	 High surf battered some homes; swamped several
small boats. 
Tides 2-4 ft above normal from
 
Norfolk, Va. to Mass. Flooding, heavy rains­
accounted for most damage. 
 6 lives lost; 4
 
drowned along coast.
 
7 	 Tides 5-8 ft above MSL recorded along La.
 
coast; up to 6 ft at Sabine Pass; damage to
 
crops biggest loss.
 
7 	 Heavy rainfall responsible for destructive
 
floods. 
Tides 2-6 ft above MSL Port Arthur to
 
Brownsville, Tex. 2 drowning deaths. 
 winds
 
at Port O'Connor, Tex. 75 kts, gusts to 87 kts.
 
Tides 2-4 ft above normal Norfolk, Va. to

Norehead City, N.C. 
 4-7 ft tides on Pamlico
 
Sound and estuaries. Damage to crops mainly

from heavv rains. Wind gusts to 80 kts at
 
Atlantic Beach, N.C.
 
One of worst natural disasters in U.S. history.

Death toll 117, damage $3.1 billion. Highest

tides in years did extensive damage in Fla, up
 
to 7 ft at Cedar Key, Pa. Flooding accounted
 
for 48 deaths.
 
6 	 Storm acted more like a northeaster. High
 
waves 
caused 	erosion ard swamped hundreds of

small boats. 4 deaths; 2 in surf, 2 in boats.
Gust of 73 kts reported at Pt. Judith, R.I.
 
Tides 5-7 
ft above MSL caused severe flooding
 
of Galveston, Tex. $3 million in damage to
homes, $3 million to crops from heavy rain,

flooding. 
 5 lives lost in Houston-Galveston
 
area.
 
DATE 
STO 
OF AREASJ~4HARDEST HIT MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WIND(KTS DAM.GE CATEGORY R K REMRKS 
1974 
Aug 29-Sept 10 
CARYEN 
Louisiana 130 8 Storm tides tanged up to 6 ft along the La. 
coast. Damage estimated at $90 million pri­
marily to sugar cane crop; some damage to off­
shore oil installaions. Highest sustained 
wind measured over La. 75 kts. 
*Tropical storm 
A.2 
64
 
Extratropical Storms
 
North Atlantic Coastal Damage
 
[Excerpted from Mariner's Weather Log (MWL)]
 
MWL Vol. 18, No. 2
 
December 17, 1973. A 988 mb low off Norfolk, Virginia
 
moved north over Rhode Island. One of the worst
 
storms in years to strike the east coast of the United
 
States. Ice storm caused severe power outages. Util­
ity companies called it the worst in 20 years. Thou­
sands of homes were without light, heat and water.
 
MWL Vol. 18, No. 1, January 1974
 
August 20, 1973. A 28-foot cabin cruiser broke up and
 
sank after hitting a jetty at Shinnecock Inlet on Long
 
Island in heavy seas and fog. Waves at the mouth of
 
the inlet were reported to be 8-10 feet from a low
 
pressure center which developed rapidly off the Caro­
lina coast.
 
MWL Vol. 17, No. 6, November 1973
 
June 9, 1973. A series of violent thunderstorms over­
turned hundreds of boats at Marblehead and Salem har­
bors, Massachusetts. CoasL Guard cutters and heli­
copters pulled some 200 persons from the water.
 
MWL Vol. 17, No. 5, September 1973
 
March 21-24, 1973. A Cape Hatteras storm of 971 mb
 
moved up the U.S. East Coast. The outer banks of
 
North Carolina took a beating for three days. At
 
least five motel units and two beach cottages were
 
destroyed. A Norwegian freighter and a motor vessel
 
sank in this storm; from crews of 30 and 29, there
 
was only one survivor.
 
MWL Vol. 18, No. 4, July 1973
 
February 10-13, 1973. A low-pressure center formed
 
180 miles east of Charleston, South Carolina on Feb­
ruary 10. For the next 36 hours, the storm devas­
tated the coastal areas of North Carolina, South
 
Carolina and Virginia. Winds of 55 knots and seas of
 
65 
40 feet were reported at the time of high tide.
 
Waves washed away huge sections of beach and destroy­
ed or damaged many beach homes and business estab­
lishments. Roads were cut by washouts and high
 
water;power was interrupted to many areas. North
 
Carolina's outer banks were especially hard hit, with
 
barrier dunes and beaches completely washed away.
 
Damage totaled $4.1 million in insured losses alone.
 
MWL Vol. 17, No. 3, May 1973
 
November 15, 1.972. A storm moved off the east coast
 
after causing millions of dollars in damages in the
 
Great Lakes area, (Michigan, $7.5 million and Ohio,
 
$22 million) due to floods and wind.
 
December 4, 1972. The drogger Alton A and 44-foot
 
Coast Guard utility boat were driven aground by
 
heavy surf at the mouth of Casco Bay, Trundy Point,
 
Maine. The Alton A,-a wooden vessel, was holed and
 
had to be salvaged.
 
MWL Vol. 17, No. 2, March 1973
 
September 21, 1972. A stationary low off Cape Hat­
teras generated heavy seas and strong winds which
 
caused a barge under tow by the tug Carolyn to break
 
'loose and crash into the Chesapeake Bay Bridge con­
necting Cape Henry and Cape Charles. The bridge was
 
knocked out in two places as 60-foot-long sections
 
collapsed into the water. The bridge was closed to
 
traffic for two weeks and the barge had to be removed
 
and repaired. The tug had encountered 35 to 40 knot
 
winds and 25 to 30-foot seas off Cincoteague before
 
entering the Bay, where wind gusts of 50 knots were
 
estimated.
 
MWL Vol. 17, No. 1, January 1973
 
October 6, 1972. A Cape Hatteras low moved north
 
over Cape Cod causing more than usual damage along
 
the coast. 35 to 40 knot gales and 51 foot seas
 
swamped three small craft from Long Island to the
 
Cape Cod area with loss of life. All were near the
 
shore.
 
MWL Vol. 16, No. 4, July 1972
 
February 4, 1972. A storm was located off the New
 
England coast with 64-knot winds. The 1'3,669 ton
 
tanker Louisiana Getty ran aground at the entrance to
 
Narragansett Bay. Storm tides were 3 feet or more
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above normal as high surf caused damage to boats
 
and coastal installations. Storm tides and high

surf also battered lobster equipment and boats
 
along the Maine coast. A boy was swept to his
 
death by a breaker at Cape Elizabeth, Maine.
 
Buildings were undermined by surf in Kittery to
 
Portland area.
 
February 14, 1972. A storm moved through Pennsyl­
vania and off the New England coast, causing ab­
normally high wind-driven tides in Chesapeake Bay
 
area of Maryland, especially near Cambridge. High

winds caused damage in New York City.
 
February 19-20, 1972. The most devastating storm
 
in 75 years moved off the Maine coast and lashed New
 
England north of the New Jersey coast with 55 to 60
 
knot gales. Big breakers pounded the coast for
 
longer than usual during a northeaster. Massachu­
setts reported $40 million damages in the wake of
 
the storm with 16 people injured. Damage was
 
greatest along the coast where storm surge tides 2
 
to 4.5 feet above the normally high spring tides
 
occurred with huge breakers and high surf. Flooded
 
coastal homes included 400 from Revere, 300 each
 
from Salem and Scituate; 27 houses destroyed, 3,000
 
damaged; sea walls and beaches were heavily damaged

in Massachusetts. In Maine, 7 dwellings were de­
stroyed, 600 damaged, sidewalks and roads were torn
 
up and boats, wharves and lobster gear smashed. In
 
New Hampshire, storm tides 2-4 feet above normal,
 
high breakers and surf damaged over 100 homes and
 
buildings, washed out roads, sidewalks and devas­
tated beaches and coastal installations.
 
MWL Vol. 16, No. 3, May 1972
 
December 18, 1971. A rapidly developing storm off
 
North Carolina coast with 50-knot winds sank a tug­
boat in Albemarle Sound; 6 persons were lost. A
 
9,165-ton Liberian cargo ship went aground at Old
 
Point Comfort, Virginia; a barge with 14,500 barrels
 
of crude oil grounded on a shoal near the mouth of
 
the Potomac River; a 55-foot yacht foundered in shal­
low water off Pamlico Sound; another 55-foot yacht

sank near Hobucken, south of Pamlico Sound and a 26­
foot cabin cruiser was driven aground at Fort Story.
 
MWL Vol. 16, No. 2, March 1972
 
October 10, 1971. A low-pressure center over Mary­
land moved north to Quebec. Several small craft
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were in trouble along the North Carolina coast
 
where two were found adrift with all personnel
 
lost.
 
MWL Vol. 15, No. 5, September 1971
 
March 2-7, 1971. A major cyclone developed over
 
Mexico, moved across the southeastern United States
 
and up coast as a 963 mb low over Portland, Maine
 
(a record for that area). A natural gas rig sprung

several leaks south of Lake Charles, Louisiana; a
 
tug sank while towing two barges off the Mississippi

coast; a supply vessel broke the anchor chain and
 
sank near New Orleans. A British freighter was torn
 
from its moorings at Baltimore, Maryland, inflicting
 
severe damage to the ship and a pier. A Greek ves­
sel dragged anchor and struck bridge abutments in
 
Narragansett Bay. High winds and 51-foot seas were
 
reported off the New England coast during the 
storm.
 
March 26-28, 1971. The second northeaster of the
 
month produced the highest water levels at Norfolk,

Virginia, since the Ash Wednesday storm of 1962.
 
The storm produced 65-knot winds at Diamond Shoals,
 
as gale warnings were displayed from Florida to New
 
England. The seawall which protects up to ten feet
 
above the mean low water park prevented 2-3 feet of
 
water in the streets of downtown Norfolk on March 26.
 
The tide crested 2.8 feet above normal at Norfolk
 
and 3.9 feet above normal at Virginia Beach. The
 
fishing pier at Virginia Beach was washed away,

along with the tide gauge. Low coastal areas were
 
flooded. A 175-foot barge sank in Hampton Roads
 
and a tanker sank off Cape Hatteras with 220,000

barrels of fuel oil aboard. Only 13 of the 44-man
 
crew were rescued.
 
April 5-8, 1971. A Gulf of Mexico wave moved north­
east and deepened rapidly off Cape Hatteras.
 
Martha's Vineyard recorded gusts to 68 knots. Tides
 
as much as 4 feet above normal, rough seas and
 
breakers superimposed on the high tide caused consid­
erable flooding and beach erosion from New Jersey to
 
the Virginia Capes.
 
MWL Vol. 15, No. 4, July, 1974
 
February 8-9, 1971. A low developed over the Gulf of
 
Mexico with 65-knot winds at Vera Cruz, Mexico. Gale
 
and storm tide warnings were issued for the Atlantic
 
Coast from New Jersey to Connecticut. As the cold
 
front from this system pushed through Florida, gusts
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MWL Vol. 15, No. 3, May 1971
 
December 26-27, 1970. Explosive deepening of a 
storm off Cape Hatteras (over 25 mb in 12 hours ­
50 mb in 24 hours) generated 50 to 65 knot winds and 
high seas. The 12,155 ton Norwegian oil tanker 
Bente Brovig and the 13,080-ton Brazilian vessel
 
Docelago dragged anchors, colliding at Hampton Roads,
 
Virginia. Two other ships sank at sea with at least
 
22 lives lost during the storm.
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North Pacific Coastal Damage
 
EExcerpted from Mariners Weather Log (MWL)]
 
NWL Vol. 18, No. 2, March 1974
 
January 17, 1974. A 68-foot fishing vessel capsized
 
off the Golden Gate Bridge in turbulent seas.
 
MWL Vol. 17, No. 5, September 1973
 
April 1, 1973. Southern California was swept by high

winds from a low over the Great Basin and a high off
 
the Pacific Coast which created 12-foot seas and 35
 
to 40 knot gales from San Francisco to Baja, Calif­
ornia. An 80-ft. boat was capsized by wind and swell
 
off San Diego.
 
MWL Vol. 17, No. 3, MayJ1973
 
December 24, 1972. A 48-foot crab boat was over­
turned three times by huge swells off the northern
 
California coast; four men were rescued.
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MWL Vol. 16, No. 6, November 1972
 
August 17-18, 1972. A low-pressure center about 200
 
miles off the Pacific Northwest caused wind gusts up
 
to 65 knots and 14-foot seas. Some 30-40 sport and
 
fishing boats were destroyed between Eureka, Calif­
ornia and Brookings, Oregon. Winds ripped off roofs,
 
toppled trees and cut electric power in coastal com­
munities. The death toll was 13.
 
MWL Vol. 15, No. 5, September 1971
 
March 12, 1971. A 959 mb low off the Pacific North­
west produced 60-knot gusts and 26-foot swells. The
 
tug Go Getter was caught off Cape Blanco, Oregon.
 
The tug was damaged and had to be rescued by the
 
Coast Guard.
 
NWL Vol. 15, No. 4, July 1971
 
January 13-15, 1971. A 964 mb low-pressure center
 
off the Pacific Northwest brought wind gusts of 80 to
 
100 knots to the Oregon coast causing $2.8 million in
 
damage, mainly to homes, buildings, -timber and live­
stock. A tug had to drop tow of 800 tons of pulp and
 
take shelter 15 miles east of Victoria, B.C.
 
January 9, 1971. The 8,101-ton Italian ship Galileo
 
Farraris collided with Pier 37 at Seattle, Washington.
 
As high winds swung the ship into the pier, a 190-ton
 
crane on the pier was toppled into the water.
 
MWL Vol. 14, No 6, November 1970
 
May 17, 1970. The Aristides Xilas, a Greek vessel,
 
left San Francisco but, due to gusty winds behind a
 
cold front, the deck lashing broke, cargo shifted and
 
hatches opened. The ship was forced to return to San
 
Francisco at reduced speed.
 
MWL Vol. 14, No. 5, September 1970
 
March 1970. Early in March, the 5,886-ton Canadian
 
barge Island Importer was blown against the west pier
 
of the Burnside Street Bridge while being guided down
 
the Willamette River at Portland, Oregon. Damage to
 
the pier was estimated at $10,000:
 
April 13-14 1970. Northwesterly gale-force winds
 
blowing along the California coast caused the 7,114­
ton Panamanian freighter La Jenelle to break from
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anchorage and go aground west of the entrance of
 
Port Hueneme, California. The vessel was awash on
 
her side.
 
MWL Vol. 14, No. 3, May 1970
 
November 4, 1969. Gales raked the Pacific Coast
 
north of Point Arena, California, just before the
 
low-pressure center moved inland at Vancouver.
 
Winds gusted to greater than 60 knots at Cape Blanco,
 
Oregon. Breakers were estimated at 35-40 feet in
 
some places. Wave damage was minimal because the
 
astronomical tide was low during the storm period.
 
MWL Vol. 13, No. 4, July 1969
 
February 5-6, 1969. Two energetic cold fronts passed

through California during this period. The second
 
front, an occlusion, was the strongest. Early on
 
6 February, seas as high as 44 feet and winds of 45
 
knots were reported west of Point Arena. Damage was
 
reported in the vicinity of the coast between San
 
Francisco and San Diego but particularly heavy losses
 
were reported near Santa Rosa and Redwood City.
 
MWL Vol. 19, No. 1, January 1975. Monterey Peninsula
 
Herald, November 13, 1974.
 
November 12, 1974. Winds of 60 knots battered the
 
western Alaska coast from a low over the Bering
 
Strait. Waves breached the sea wall and flooded
 
areas of Nome to a depth of 5 feet and pushed sea
 
water into at least six other coastal communities.
 
Some buildings were destroyed and numerous persons
 
forced from their homes. Half of the city of Nome
 
was without electric power; the sewage system was
 
out and the water supply suspect. Two main streets
 
were flooded. Other villages reported collapsing sea
 
walls and widespread flooding. Governor William A.
 
Egan termed the devastation a "fullscale disaster"
 
and called on President Ford to supply federal dis­
aster assistance funds for the coastal communities.
 
MWL Vol 14, No. 4, July 1970
 
January 14, 1970. A strong cold front struck Hawaii,
 
resulting in the greatest dollar damage ($6.84 mil­
lion) ever reported for that state for a single
 
weather event. There was $4.48 million in damage to
 
the army barracks on Oahu alone. Wind gusts to 83
 
knots were reported.
 
72
 
A.3 Tsunamis
 
Although tsunamis, seismic sea waves, occasionally
 
cause severe damage in coastal zones (particularly around the
 
Pacific basin), the warning system now in being is considered
 
to be very good.
 
Pararas-Carayannis has published a Catalog of
 
Tsunamis in the Hawaiian Islands which indicates that the
 
islands have been struck by eight-five seismic sea waves in
 
the last century and a half. These tsunamis caused at least
 
383 deaths and damage estimated at $57,000,000. Because of
 
its harbor configuration, Hilo has suffered more damage than
 
any other Hawaiian city. Major seismic waves damaged Hilo in
 
1837, 1868, 1946 and 1960.
 
Cox reports that Alaska has experienced forty
 
tsunamis in 181 years. The Scotch Cap Tsunami, which claimed
 
79 lives, is the most famous case in recent years. Various
 
West Coast areas of the United States have suffered some
 
damage from seismic sea waves, but no good economic summaries
 
could be found. However, Bascom states that Los Angeles
 
and San Diego harbors suffered a million dollars worth of
 
damage to piers and small craft during the 1960 tsunami.
 
Pararas-Caroyannis, G., A Catalogue of Tsunamis in
 
the Hawaiian Islands, Environmental Science Service Administration,
 
Honolulu, Hawaii.
 
** Cox, D. C. and G. Pararas-Caroyannis, Catalogue of
 
Tsunamis in Alaska, Environmental Science Service Administration,
 
Honolulu, Hawaii.
 
*** Bascom, W., Waves and Beaches, Science Study Series,
 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., New York, 1964, pp 267.
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A.4 Surf
 
Pacific 	Coast and Hawaiian Islands Damage Reports
 
[Excerpted Mariner's Weather Log (MWL)]
 
MWL Vol. 14, No. 3, May 1970
 
December 4-6, 1969. The two huge Pacific storms that
 
caused the tremendous waves over the Hawaiian Islands the
 
first part of December 1969 directed their energy toward
 
The
the Southern California coast on December 4th and 6th. 

first swells averaged 5 to 8 feet with an occasional 10­
footer arriving off the Southern California Coast early on
 
December 4th. Directly exposed beach areas were pounded
 
by 12-14 foot breakers with the more sheltered areas re­
porting breakers in the 4-8 foot range. Because the
 
breakers arrived on slightly above normal high tides, beach
 
damage consisted mainly of weakened and undermined sea
 
walls. Many tons of protective sand were transported away
 
from low-lying beach areas. A heavy spray washed over and
 
closed the 25-foot pier at Ocean Beach. There were 9-foot
 
waves at beaches from Oceanside to Del Mar, and in South
 
Carlsbad water swept into a parking lot that-is normally
 
10 feet above high tide. The Ventura Pier was damaged by
 
20-foot waves and closed until damage could be fully asses­
sed. An undetermined number of pilings were broken. Two
 
young men were missing off Santa Barbara when their 14­
foot skiff was swamped a short distance from a larger boat
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they were trying to reach.
 
Swells of 8-10 feet with 10 to 18-foot breakers
 
were forecast to reach Southern California beaches early
 
on December 6th from the second storm. Disaster and
 
property protection agencies quickly mobilized men and
 
equipment to meet this heavy onslaught. Arriving on
 
spring tides some 4 feet above normal high tide, the sit­
uation was quite critical for many beach areas already
 
vulnerable because of damage inflicted only 48 hours
 
earlier. Swells of 8-10 feet with some near 12 feet and
 
breakers 12-20 feet hammered away at exposed beaches
 
through December 6th. Some of the giant breakers over­
topped the 20-foot seawall at Redondo Beach and 15-foot
 
breakers rolled under the Redondo Beach Pier. Heavy seas
 
were listed as the contributing factor to the loss _of_ 
lives during the period while damage wrertyei­
mated near $1.5 million. Several beach homes were de­
stroyed, 30 more were flooded and over 100 others were
 
evacuated. A possible greater loss of life and prop­
erty would have occurred had it not been for the efforts
 
of disaster agencies and volunteer workers who hastily

repaired sand dikes and replaced sand bag barriers which
 
were constantly being destroyed by the raging seas.
 
MWL Vol. 14, No. 3,*May 1970
 
December 12-14, 1969. A 963 mb low moved into the
 
eastern North Pacific and then north toward Alaska with
 
55-knot winds and 33-foot seas. Waves up to 24-feet
 
pounded the municipal fishing pier at Ocean Beach, Calif­
ornia on December 14th. Four lives were lost and more
 
than $1 million damage was reported to Southern Califor­
nia beach areas. At Ensenada, Mexico, fishermen report­
ed more than 100 small boats and 4,000 lobster traps de­
stroyed.
 
December 15-20, 1969. A 956 mb low moved east
 
toward the California Coast, then changed direction and
 
moved northwest toward Alaska. The low held about 956 nb
 
for 36 hours, having combined with a second low-pressure
 
center. Winds near hurricane force spawned huge waves
 
that lashed beachfront homes at Oxnard, California on Dec­
ember 19th. The storm sank a Navy patrol boat and beached
 
another.
 
MWL Vol. 13, No. 4, July 1969
 
January 18-26, 1969. A vast area of low pressure
 
over the eastern Pacific spawned a succession of low-pres­
sure centers that lashed the California coastline for nine
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straight days. Six frontal systems passed over Southern
 
California. These fronts brought high winds (50 to 60
 
knots) and very heavy rain to coastal areas of the state
 
and to vessels in offshore waters. An estimated $125
 
million damage occurred in seven counties adjoining the
 
Los Angeles area. At least 45 deaths are directly

attributed to the storm. A number of principal highways

and some mainline railroads were closed by flooding or
 
mud slides and utilities were disrupted in many areas.
 
At least 9,000 persons were'evacuated to safety. Wind
 
damage to marinas and boats occurred in several areas.
 
Sherman Island, a dike-protected agricultural area of
 
more than 10,000 acres, was covered with up to 20 feet of
 
water where a section of the dike gave way. The passage

of ocean vessels to inland ports was curtailed for sev­
eral days as a protection to other storm-weakened dikes
 
in the delta.
 
MWL Vol. 18, No. 2, March 1974
 
January 7, 1974. A monster surf pounded the north
 
shore of Oahu at popular surfing site Waimea Bay. An
 
intense winter storm midway between Hawaii and the
 
Aleutians produced waves of 35 feet which resulted in 18­
foot waves on the.north shore of Oahu. These waves caused
 
widespread damage throughout the Hawaiian Islands.
 
1,91L Vol. 17, No. 1, January 1973
 
August 18, 1972. Waves generated by hurricane DIANA
 
created heavy surf greater than 25 feet which pounded the
 
southeast coast of Hawaii. At Kapoho Beach, damage to
 
four homes was estimated at $701000. 
MWL Vol. 1.5, No. 3, May 1971
 
November 24, 1970. Long fetch area on the east side
 
of a Pacific high-pressure area with northerly winds
 
created waves to 25 feet along the north coast of the
 
Hawaiian Islands. Many homes and roads were inundated
 
and a major inter-island harbor was closed.
 
MWL Vol. 14, No. 3, May 1970
 
December 20, 1969. Complex low-pressure systems over
 
the eastern North Pacific spawned winds near hurricane
 
force. The cold front from this storm passed Kauai and
 
Oahu on December 20th. High surf drove more than 100 per­
sons from their homes as an alert was issued for all of
 
Hawaii. Families were evacuated from homes on the north
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shore of Oahu and Red Cross shelters were mobilized. The
 
surf caused the closing of roads at many points on the
 
island.
 
December 1, 1969. An intense storm which developed
 
in the western Pacific on November 29th moved east at
 
relatively low latitudes before turning toward the Gulf
 
of Alaska. Gale force winds over a 900-mile fetch built
 
monstrous seas directed at the Hawaiian Islands. Ship
 
reports in the fetch area reported 55-knot northwesterly
 
winds and 35-foot seas. Decaying only slightly, these
 
waves pounded the Hawaiian Island chain with 30 to 40­
foot breakers on December 1st. Later on the 2nd, tre­
mendous waves, rising up to 50 feet in some places,
 
slammed into a 10-mile stretch of the north shore of Oahu.
 
Two persons were reported missing and a third man died of
 
a heart attack, while fifteen persons were slightly in­
jured. The heavy surf necessitated the evacuation of
 
more than 1,000 people from their homes. One giant wave
 
rolled over a house standing 26 feet above sea level and
 
left seaweed on its roof. Other homes were pushed off
 
their foundations and left standing in roadways. Offi­
cials estimated that at least 34 homes were destroyed,
 
and property damage was estimated at more than $1 million.
 
December 4-5, 1969. Another huge storm with a
 
history of 60-knot winds rolled across the Pacific in the
 
wake of the December 1-2 storm. The cold front reached
 
Kauai at about 1200Z on December 4th. During the next 24
 
hours, it penetrated all the Hawaiian Islands except the
 
big island of Hawaii, and caused 40-foot surf. The num­
ber of home evacuees increased from more than 1,000 from
 
the previous storm to 2,000 persons.
 
A.5 
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Coastal Monterey, California USCG Calls
 
For Assistance 
- 1974 Records
 
The records were frequently incomplete as to property
 
damage estimates or property values in particular cases, but
 
contain sufficient information to indicate the magnitude of
 
property lost or damaged for a specific area which may be applied
 
to estimates for larger areas.
 
Month Summary of Most Significant Events Weather Conditions
 
(Calls for Assistance)
 
JAN 74 	 50-ft. sailboat ($30,000 property) WIND: NW 35 KTS
 
7 miles west of Point Sur taking SEAS: NW 18 FT
 
on water. 3 persons on board. VIS: 4 miles
 
Machinery problems complicated by

weather. USCG towed vessel to
 
Monterey. No damage estimate.
 
15-ft, outboard ($1,000 property) WIND: N 10-15 KTS
 
20 yards off-shore near Hopkins SEAS: 2-4 FT
 
Marine Station capsized and Moderate surf
 
smashed against the rocks. Two
 
persons on board. 1 fatality.
 
1 survivor. Boat was total loss.
 
Large swell passed under boat
 
while passengers engaged in fish­
ang.
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Month Summary of Most Significant Events Weather Conditions 
JAN 74 Total calls for assistance: 11 
Known damage: $1,000 
Fatalities: 1 
FEB 74 6-ft rubber raft ($100 property) 
adrift 50 yards offshore unable 
to make headway with oars. Surf 
too rough. 2 persons onboard. 
USCG towed raft to safety. 
WIND: NE 6 KTS 
SEAS: 1-2 FT 
VIS: 15 miles 
20-ft. sailboat ($5,000 property) 
dragging anchor, possibly caught 
under the wharf. USCG removed 
vessel. None on board. No dam­
age estimate. 
WIND: NNE 18 KTS 
SEAS: 2 FT 
VIS: Unlimited 
32-ft fishing boat ($5,000 prop-
erty) ran aground; broke up on 
rocks off Yankee Point and sank 
as it was destroyed by the surf. 
I person onboard rescued from 
water by Army helicopter. Boat 
was total loss. 
WIND: 
SEAS: 
6 KTS 
5-7 FT 
10-ft sailboat ($300 property) 
with broken mast 200 yards off-
shore. 2 persons onboard. USCG 
towed vessel to safety. No dam­
age estimate. 
WIND: 
SEAS: 
NW 18 KTS 
3-4 FT 
25-ft inboard boat ($2,500 prop-
erty) ran aground in Moss-Land-
ing Channel. 5 persons onboard. 
Refloated by USCG and towed to 
safety. No damage estimate. 
WIND: 
SEAS: 
WNW 24 KTS 
9-10 FT 
18-ft fishing troller broke moor-
ing 1/3 mile offshore. None on-
board. USCG towed vessel to 
safety. No damage estimate. 
WIND: 
SEAS: 
WNW 21 KTS 
3 FT 
Total calls for assistance: 
Known damage: $5,000 
Fatalities: 0 
20 
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Month Summary of Most Significant Events Weather Conditions 
MAR 74 18-ft sailboat capsized 1 mile off-
shore with broken mast. Towed to 
safety by private vessel. No dam­
age estimate. 
WIND: 
SEAS: 
SW 15 KTS 
2-3 FT 
26-ft sailboat ($8,000 property) 
dragging anchor 1/4 mile offshore. 
None aboard. USCG safely moored 
vessel. No damage. 
WIND: 
SEAS: 
WNW 20 KTS 
3-4 FT 
24-ft cabin cruiser ($7,500 prop-
erty) disabled 1/2 mile offshore.4 persons onboard. USCG towed ves-
WIND: 
SEAS: 
S 20 KTS 
5-6 FT 
sel to Santa Cruz. 
mate. 
No damage esti­
26-ft pleasure boat ($5,000 prop-
erty) ran aground 100 yards east 
er Santa Cruz. 3 persons onboard. 
People got ashore. USCG unable to 
pull boat to safety. Vessel was 
reported to be breaking up in surf. 
Owner seeking commercial assistance. 
Final damage and disposal unknown. 
WIND: S 2 KTS 
SEAS: 3-4 FT 
High Surf 
SKY: OVC/FOG 
VIS: 1/4 mile 
14-ft sailboat ($GOO property) cap-
sized 1-1/4 miles off Santa Cruz. 
3 persons onboard. 2 drowned, 1 
rescued but later died. Boat was 
lost. 
WIND: 
SEAS: 
SKY: 
VIS: 
SE 10 KTS 
2.FT 
Overcast 
8 miles 
Swimmer in trouble 50 yards offshore 
at Carmel Point. Person drowned. 
WIND: 
SEAS: 
NW 14 KTS 
5-6 FT 
14-ft inboard/outboard ($3,500 prop-
erty) adrift 300 yards off Point 
Pinos. Engine failed as boat was 
dangerously near the rocks. 2 per-
sons onboard. USCG reached vessel 
in time and towed to safety. No 
damage. 
WIND: 
SEAS: 
SKY: 
VIS: 
NW 14 KTS 
8-10 FT 
Clear 
20 miles 
Total calls for assistance: 
Known damage: $600 
Fatalities: 4 
27 
REPRODUCBILTY OF THE
 
QRI I NAL PAGE IS POOL
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Month Summary of Most Significant Events Weather Conditions 
APR 74 30-ft commercial fishing boat 
($30,000 property) ran aground 
200 yards off Pt. Pinos; broken 
up on rocks by surf. 4 persons 
onboard. Rescued by Army heli­
copter and treated at Monterey 
Hospital. Boat was destroyed. 
WIND: NW 12 KTS 
SEAS: 5-6 FT 
Commercial fishing boat was de-
masted 5 miles offshore. USCG 
WIND: NW 12 KTS 
SEAS: 6-8 FT 
towed boat to safety. 
estimate given. 
No damage 
33-ft commercial fishing boat 
($100,000 property) was disabled 
2 miles offshore with broken fuel 
line. USCG towed vessel to Moss 
Landing and safety. 
WIND: W 14 KTS 
SEAS: 6-7 FT 
18-ft sailboat capsized off Santa 
Cruz; boat righted itself and 
made harbor safely. No damage 
estimate. 
WIND: NW 27 KTS 
SEAS: 4-5 FT 
20-ft sailboat capsized near 
Santa Cruz. 2 persons onboard. 
1 rescued; 1 missing.' No damage 
estimate. 
WIND: NW 27 KTS 
SEAS: 4-5 FT 
Total calls for assistance: 
Known damage: $30,000 
Fatalities: 1 
26 
MAY 74 16-ft trimaran ($1,600 property) 
capsized 1 mile SE of Santa Cruz. 
WIND: W 30-35 KTS 
SEAS: 6-8 FT 
18-ft catamaran ($2,000 property) 
capsized 1-1/2 miles south of 
Santa Cruz. 3 persons onboard. 
USCG towed vessel to safety at 
Santa Cruz. 
WIND: 30-40 KTS 
SEAS: 3-4 FT 
Total calls for assistance: 
Known damage: none 
Fatalities: 0 
38 
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Month Summary of Most Significant Events Weather Conditions
 
JUN 74 23-ft Inboard/outboard boat 
($10,000 property) in the sur
miles south of Moss Landing. 
persons onboard. 
f 3 
2 
WIND: 
SEAS: 
SW 10 KTS 
Surf 4 FT 
20-ft catamaran ($6,000 property) 
1 mile offshore. None onboard. 
Towed to safety by USCG. 
WIND:, 
SEAS:, 
22 KTS 
1-2 FT 
Total calls for assistance: 
Known damage: none 
Fatalities: 0 
24 
JUL 74 	 18-ft inboard/outboard (4,000 prop- WIND: NW 18 KTS
 
erty) dragging anchor 1/8 mile off-- SEAS: 1-2 FT
 
shore. USCG moored vessel safely.
 
4 other small boats broke moorings. WIND: 10-15 KTS
 
All were retrieved by USCG. No SEAS: 1-3 FT
 
damage. VIS: Good
 
Total calls for assistance: 21
 
Known damage: none
 
Fatalities: 0
 
AUG 74 	 Fishing boat ($60,000 property) WIND: Calm
 
on rocks 	near Pt. Sur. 3 persons SEAS: Heavy
 
onboard, 	rescued. Boat not salvag- breakers
 
eable (total loss). 	 SKY: Obscured/fog
 
Total calls for assistance: 17
 
Known damage: $60,000
 
Fatalities: 0
 
SEPT 74 	 25-ft Sea Scout vessel adrift in WIND: NW 14 KTS
 
danger of breaking up. 5 persons SEAS: 3-4 FT
 
onboard. USCG towed vessel to
 
safety.
 
14-ft sailboat offshore overturned, WIND: 4 KTS
 
adrift and demasted. 1 person on- SEAS: 2-3 FT
 
board, rescued. Small damage.
 
ITota1 calls for assistance: 24
 
Known damage: none
 
Fatalities: 0
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Month Summary of Most Significant Events Weather Conditions
 
OCT 74 70-ft fishing boat dragging anchor 
1/4 mile offshore. None onboard. 
USCG safely moored vessel. 
WIND: 
SEAS: 
25 KTS 
4-5 FT 
18-ft outboard boat dragging anchor 
1/2 mile offshore. USCG towed 
vessel to safety, Monterey Marina. 
WIND: 
SEAS: 
SKY: 
VIS: 
28 KTS 
6-7 FT 
OVC/RAIN 
6 miles 
20-ft inboard boat broke moorings 
1/4 mile offshore. Picked up by 
another vessel. 
WIND: 
SEAS: 
SKY: 
VIS: 
28 KTS 
6-8 FT 
OVC/RAIN 
6 miles 
30-ft fishing boat dragging anchor 
1/4 mile offshore. USCG towed 
vessel to safety at Monterey. 
WIND: 
SEAS: 
SKY: 
VIS: 
28 KTS 
9-10 FT 
OVC 
10 miles 
35-ft fishing boat dragging anchor 
1/4 mile offshore. Safely moored 
to another vessel by USCG. 
WIND: 
SEAS: 
SKY: 
28 KTS 
9-10 FT 
OVC 
20-ft sailboat and 18-ft sailboat 
dragging anchor 1/8 mile offshore. 
USCG safely moored both vessels 
to buoy. 
WIND: 
SEAS: 
VIS: 
15 KTS 
3-5 FT 
12 miles 
19-ft outboard ($5,000 property) 
disabled and ran aground. USCG 
unable to tow boat through surf. 
All persons on board safely on 
shore. Owner received commercial 
assistance. No damage estimate. 
WIND: 
SEAS: 
SKY: 
VIS: 
15 KTSI 
5-7 FT 
OVC 
10 miles 
Total calls for assistance: 40 
Known damage: 
Fatalities: 0 
none 
NOV 74 Several boats were driven ashore 
by an overnight storm. One was an 
approximately 40-ft. fishing boat 
with full cargo of fish which was 
a total loss. Property damage and 
loss estimated at $137,000. 
Unknown 
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Total calls for assistance: 
Known damage: $137,000 
Fatalities: 0 
16 
DEC 74 42- ft. fishing boat ($35,000 prop-
erty) disabled with engine failure 
1-1/2 miles offshore. USCG towed 
to safety. No damage. 
WIND: ESE 25 KTS 
SEAS: 6-7 FT 
22-ft sailboat ($4,000 property) 
dragging anchor 50 yards offshore. 
US1CG towed boat to safety. No dam-
WIND: 
SEAS: 
20 KTS 
3 FT 
age. 
4 boats, 18- and 26-ft., moored to 
a raft, dragging anchor 50 yards 
offshore. USCG safely moored boats! 
to a buoy. No damage. 
2 boats on rocks. 1 broke up and 
sank. One, a 40-ft launch, was 
towed to safety by USCG. No esti-
mate except moderate damage to 
launch. 1 other fishing boat de­
stroyed in surf. Damage unknown. 
WIND: 25 KTS 
Gust to 30 KTS 
SEAS: 7-8 FT 
SKY: OVC 
VIS: 5 miles' 
WIND: 25 KTS 
SEAS: 7-8 FT 
SKY: OVC 
VIS: 5 miles 
Total calls for assistance: 10 
Known damage: 1 boat sank; 1 boat 
destroyed in surf 
Fatalities: 0 
ANNUAL 
TOTAL 
Calls for assistance: 274 
Known damage: $233,600 + 
Fatalities: 6 
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A.6 
 Hurricane Phenomena
 
Hurricane Disaster-Potential Scale: Scale No. 1-Winds of 74 to 95 miles 
per hour. Damage primarily to shrubbery,The hurricane disaster-potential scale is trees, foliage and unanchored mobile 
an experimental effort by the National homes. No real damage to other struc-
Weather Service to give public safety offi- tures. Some damage to poorly constructed 
cials a continuing assessment of the po- signs. Or: storm surge 4 to 5 feet above 
tential for wind and storm-surge damage normal. Low-lying coastal roads inun­from a hurricane after it reaches a point dated, minor pier damage, smallsome
where it could be a threat to their coastal craft in exposed anchorages torn from 
populations. moorings.
Scale numbers are made available to Scale No. 2-Winds of 96 to 110 milespublic-safety officials when a hurricane is per hour. Considerable damage to shrub­
within 72 hours of landfall. bery and tree foliage, some trees blown Scale numbers range from 1 to 5-with down. Major damage to exposed mobile 
Scale No. 1 having at least the threshold homes. Extensive damage to poorly con­
windsoeed of a hurricane of 74 miles per structed signs. Some damage to roofinghour, or a storm surge 4 to 5 feet above materials of buildings; some window and
normal water level-and Scale No. 5 hay- door damage. No major damage to build­
ing a windspeed of 155 miles per hour or ings. Or: storm surge 6 to 8 feet above 
more, or a storm surge more than 18 feet normal. Coastal roads and low-lying es­
above normal. cape routes inland cut by rising water 2 
The Weather Service emphasizes that to 4 hours before arrival of hurricane
the disaster-potential numbers are not center. Considerable damage to piers.
forecasts, but will be based on observed Marinas flooded. Small craft in unpro­
conditions at a'given time in a hurricane's tected anchorages torn from moorings.lifespan. They represent an estimate of Evacuation of some shoreline residences 
what the storm would do to a coastal area and low-lying island areas required.
if it were to strike without change in de- Scale No. 3-Winds of 111 to 130 miles
structive power. Scale assessments will per hour. Foliage torn from trees, large
be revised regularly as new observations trees blown down. Practically all poorly
are made, and public-safety organizations constructed signs blown down. Some 
will be continually advised of new esti- damage to roofing materials of buildings;
mates of the hurricane's disaster poten- some window and door damage. Some 
tial. structural damage to small buildings.
The Disaster-Potential Scale gives prob- Mobile homes destroyed. Or: storm surge
able property damage and evacuation 9 to 12 feet above normal. Serious flood­
recommendations as follows: ing at coast and many smaller structures 
Definition of the Scale 
Central 
Pressure 
Category (millibars) Winds (mph) Surge (ft) Example 
1 >980 74-95 4-5 Agnes 1972 (Fla.coast) 
2 965-979 96-110 6-8 Cleo 1964 
3 
4 
945-964 
920-944 
.111-130 
131-155 
9-12 
13-18 
Betsy 1965 
Donna 1960 Fla., Carla 1961 Tex. 
5 <920 >155 >18 1935 Storm on Fla. Keys 
'[eveloped by Hl-rb,-rt C.,IMfr, Dade Coiiioy consulting enpineer, 
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near coast destroyed; larger structures 
near coast damaged by battering waves 
and floating debris. Low-lying escape 
routes inland cut by rising water 3 to 5 
hours before hurricane center arrives. 
Flat terrain 5 feet or less above sea level 
flooded inland 8 miles or more. Evacua­
tion of low-lying residences within several 
blocks of shoreline possibly required. 
Scale No. 4-Wnds of 131 to 155 miles 
per hour. Shrubs and trees blown down, 
all signs down. Extensive damage to 
roofing materials, winnows and doors. 
Complete failure of roofs on many small 
residences Complete destruction of mo­
bile homes. Or: storm surge 13 to 18 feet 
above normal. Flat terrain 10 feet or less 
above sea level flooded inland as far as 6 
miles. Major damage to lower floors of 
structures near shore due to flooding and 
battering by waves and floating debris. 
Low-lying escape routes inland cut by 
rising water 3 to 5 hours before hurricane 
center arrives. Major erosion of beaches. 
Massive evacuation of all residences 
within 500 yards of shore possibly re­
quired, and of single-story residences on 
low ground within 2 miles of shore. 
Scale No. 5-Winds greater than 155 
miles per hour. Shrubs and trees blown 
down, considerable damage to roofs of 
buildings; all signs down. Very severe and 
extensive damage to windows and doors. 
Complete failure of roofs on many resi­
dences and industrial buildings. Extensive 
shattering of glass in windows and doors-
Some complete building failures. Small 
buildings overturned or blown away. Com­
plete destruction of mobile homes. Or: 
storm surge greater than 18 feet above 
normal. Major damage to lower floors of 
all structures less than 15 feet above sea 
level within 500 yards of shore. Low-lying 
escape routes inland cut by rising water 
3 to 5 hours before hurricane center ar­
rives. Massive evacuation of residential 
areas on low ground within 5 to 10 miles 
of shore possibly required. 
